Notebook of Avon Reah Smith-Ryan, 1942-1945

Sat 30 Jan.  This was almost completed but in any case each
gun had the number of belts ordered at the post, A M. at
brought a meagre number of spare parts. (Lock springs and
firing pins).  It was indeed fortunate that I had heard, 
on the Friday morning before leaving the Level Base of the 
abandoned store. Capt Jack Thompson & I drove round in 
my van & took in 30 minutes more spare parts than the
unit had seen in its previous 14 months training- & this 
after Bn A M. had assured us that there wasn't a spare 
part than to be had in the islands. As we drove out we passed 
the Army picquet arriving to take over the store. So
for the first time the Coy men had an ample supply of spare
parts. - We also supplied the other Coys with what they
wanted.
Soon after day light I went to forward H.Q.
at 756282 on the hill overlooking the Causeway & Straits.
The C.O. & L.O were in the vicinity and advised that
demolition would occur soon. Argylle Regt marched
over the Causeway in good order with pipers playing.
This was really a fine sight. Arty. I.P. close to fwd.
H.Q. received inf. that the withdrawal was complete
and at approx. 0800 hrs the Causeway was blown. The
first charge caused a breach about 1000s from the
Southern end. A second charge was then exploded.

B Coy Manning Chart  7 Apr 42
O/c. Capt G M Bunning  (Confidential)
2 I/c    "      A. R. [[S?]]-Ryan
C/M  [[?]]  A S Henty
Sgt Campbell  Cpl Barnett [[?]]Cpl    [[?]] [[?]]   }                L/Cpl [[Hallemere?]])
Pte Gibbs      [[?]]    Pte Japp       a& s          "   Vaughan}Cpls   Pte Ridgewell)
  "   Carric  [[??]]         "  Taylor          "              "    [[?]]        }              "    Lonsdale)[[?]]
                                      "  Colby          "              "  [[?]]          }              "     Morris     )
                                      "  Biggs         "              "  Hagben )Cpls        "    [[Broadbank?]]
                                      " hamer        "              " Jackson  )[[?]]                                 [[??]] 

apparently in the same place and a definite gap
was caused, water seeming to flow through. As I
watched the spot first we I saw a huge brown mess
hurled hundreds of feet into the air then heard the
noise of the explosion. It was not as bad as I expected
but rather a dull heavy irresistible noise. Then the
air were [[s?]] & had the effect of some one punching
me in the stomach. Lastly the pieces started falling
around us & back in H.Q. gully pieces of stone were
falling & this was say 1300ft from the explosion. A
causeway is not an easy thing to blow however and
I'm afraid that after we were no longer able to cover
the causeway by with fire it would not take the Japanese
long to make temporary repairs.
We awaited the blowing of the railway
bridge at 754298 & were ready to take shelter against
falling stones as this was only a short distance to our
left. However it did not occur and to my knowledge
it had was not blown.
Sun 1 Feb On Sunday the Coy came under Comd.
27 Inf. Bde. and 48^th (attached) returned to 'A' Coy this pm.
Sigs and stretcher bearers were also returned to Bn H.Q. 

At this stage Bn H.Q. with H.Q Coy & Reinforcements and
A Coy, the last forming Div source were in bivouac
at 706169 off JUKONG Rd.
Coy H.Q remained at CAUSEWAY GULLY until Tuesday
morning and continued to administer for the Coy during
their preparation of positions under orders 27 Bde [[Bns?]]
Difficulty was experienced in leaving our water trailer.
The Coy left was limited to 5. 18 cwt vans and none

of these had towing fittings. The gear fitted by our
L.A.D. at Naval Base was a failure and after breaking
the spare tyre carrier on 2 of our vans we were forced
to use a private vehicle. Water Point @ this time was
at 741221. The private vehicle was a 30 cwt model 
'A' Ford the property of Mr Guan Soon. I'm certain
that if Mr Soon realised how his old truck helped
our war effort over the next fortnight he would be
mighty pleased. It was very moody & quite often
had to be towed to start. There was no key and
Coy Mechanic Gibbs had so rearranged the wiring that
it was extremely difficult to leave her overnight &
be sure that the ignition was not switched on.
2 Feb 42  On the evening of of
8 PL had some rather heavy work to do constructing
posts at the GROIN at SUNGEI KRANJI and PINEAPPLE factory. 

and Sunday night O/C called for as many men as
possible to go out to load stone & convey by water to the
GROIN to raise breastworks above the mangrove sand.
This had to be done by night as enemy more probably
in occupation of the opposite shore by this time.
About 0400 his O/C told me to go back and
contact our Bn H.Q. I went back but of course they 
were all asleep. Sam had habits like this - to use
all the best part of the day himself, expecting me
to be in the Coy area during his absence & still expect
me to get my bit done without apparently realising
that during the day was the time I could see the
various people & get arrangements made. In addition
I believe that an order should be more specific
regarding the adm [[?]] & the wishes and plan of
the comd. would be better carried out. Not to say
'You fix up the adm. side & then when some effort
is made decide that it doesn't fit in with requirements.
On the Monday evening 2 Feb O/C brought word
that as from the following morning PLs would come
directly under the Inf. Bns. (7 PL 29 Bn Bde Reserve, 8 PL
26 Bn. & 9^th 30 Bn) for orders and for rations. It
was not for some days that Bde. instructions were
[[hted?]] out of hours that Bns. were responsible for ammn. 

and that Coy through our Bn were responsible for
ordnance matters, (parts, clothing, equipment and such like)
Coy 'B' Ech was to join 27 Bde B. Ech at
JURONG BRICKWORKS 685164 next day. This point about 8 miles
along the SUKONG Rd west from BUKIT TIMAH village was actually
outside the Bde. area, but I understand that they had established
these before the Bde areas had been defined. I and my C.Q.M.S
S/Sgt Campbell to locate the area and to deliver one days rations
to 2/29 Bn. Q.M on account of 7 PL  This was another time
when I had to battle round in the small hours of the
morning, endeavouring to contact people who had the sense to
be asleep at those ungodly hours. As there was no action at
this time and none actually imminent it certainly seemed
quite a good idea and anyway those units had seen quite
some action on the mainland and should have known
whether at this stage frantic rushing round for the clock
sound was necessary or advisable.
In later discussions I found from another Coy
Comd that the same had applied during his experience.
Less seasoned campaigners ordered patrols at all hours
when it must have been plain that that could serve no
purpose other than to rob sleep and rest from troops who
had need later of such reserves as they could [[muster?]] 

Tues 3 Feb  Coy B Ech. moved as ordered @ 0800 hrs on this
day and accepted the area allotted by the Bde T.O. (Capt Yule).
To move all the stores & ammn (ammn 3 tons) on available
tpt necessitated two trips. The 5 vans in the Coy were at this
time distributed as follows. O/C 1, 8 PL 1, B Ech 3, In
addition, of course, we had Mr Guan Soon's contribution,
at this time popularly known as 'The Red Terror'. I fancy
that it could only have struck terror into the hearts of
those I called on to drive or ride on it.
We left picquets on the gear left behind and
they state that the area was machine gunned from the
air after our departure.  As our Arty was operating from
a nearby gully it is thought that our bivouac site had
been brought to notice while aircraft were searching for
the Bty. positions.  It was never pleasant to have Arty
nearby for they always draw attention.
The area allotted by Bde T.O. was NOT good - and
lacked overhead cover and we were eventually able to
move to a better site & had a good [[terrace?]] area. Water
at this stage was drawn from a hydrant at BUKIT TIMAH
village. There were two good wells in the Bde site passed
by the M.O. as fit for use after boiling.
Another advantage here was that our Bn H.Q. 

was only 1 mile away. Coy Clerk (Pte M^cGregor) was
provided with a bicycle for daily contact.  I also made
daily contact but visits to Bn. always seemed to leave
one with a sense of frustration. The atmosphere whether
it be @ the Orderly Room or the Q.M. office seemed always
to be charged with something that made you sense
that things weren't well, and that your visit wasn't helping
any either.
There was little that could be done for PLs over the
next few days.  9 PL remained fairly stable under Comd.
2/30 Bn. at the CAUSEWAY & 7 PL also were settled with 2/29 Bn.
in Bde reserve Role at 929217.  8 PL under comd 2/26 Bn.
were finally moved to a position in the area of C Coy 30 Bn.
from where that could best cover 26 Bn front.  At this
time 30 Bn took over the rationing of 8 PL. Their task
necessitated long ranges and they were  allotted Mach VIII
ammn. by Bde. but reversible backsight leafs ordered
to be handed to them by 2/26 Bn. were NOT received.
8 PL had various moves. Firstly they were to occupy positions
previously prepared at the KRANJI GROIN and at PINEAPPLE
FACTORY, then they moved into the Coconut Grove near to
fishing village West of the Causeway, and then to the
positions in C Coy 26 Bn's area. 

It was while they were in the Coconut Grove
that I paid them a visit at an awkward time.
An enemy plane was doing his best to set alight or
blow up the oil tanks nearby. I had left my van on
the road MARSLING road & cut over the hill taking
Harry Dean and Syd Hogben with me. We came upon
the Indian Troops vacating the tank area above the main
road because a few incendiary showers had fallen in
their area. They seemed in quite a hurry. As we came
to the gate on the road an officer advised us NOT to
cross the road unless absolutely necessary. The remainder
of the oil tanks over the road had received considerable
attention but were well constructed and well covered
with earth and the only real damage had been to tank
vehicles on the pavements.
We passed straight through and reached 8 PL
just on the other side. I had a look at their tasks and
positions & then our friend came back for another shot
at the tanks. He flew up and down and altogether must
have dropped about 20 small bombs. The spongy
nature of the clay made the dugout shelter rock like
a boat. There seemed to be more danger of becoming seasick
than anything else. Certainly small incendiaries weren't