Unit diaries relating to service of Geoffrey W. Fennell - Wallet 1 - Part 8

reconnoitre the area shown on the trace. A very good hide was found early on, 

and a DR was sent to collect B Echelon, and establish the Wagon Lines there at 

once, as other units were beginning to arrive. The Regiment was to support 

22 Ind Inf Bde on arrival, and were given an area on the PONGOL peninsular. 

88 Fd Regt RA were to be on the Right, supporting 8 Ind Inf Bde. Positions were 

found for 63/81 Fd Bty and the Volunteer 18 pdr Battery on the edge of two 

clearings on the Estate itself, and 73 Fd Bty found good positions in depth on the 

main road leading to PONGOL and the Coast. The positions were occupied during 
the night, and digging commenced the following morning.

It was expected that the Infantry Brigades would arrive in three days’ time, but 

on the 29th, news was received that 22 Ind Inf Bde was isolated, and would 

certainly not arrive in a formed body. 18 Division, less one Brigade, which had 

been badly cut up at BATU PAHAT on the MUAR river, had just landed, but the 

ships containing the guns and vehicles of 148 Fd Regt had not been unloaded. 
The fresh grouping worked out at follows:

54 Inf Bde were to take over the front originally allotted to 8 and 22 Ind Inf 

Bdes, and stretch from CHANGI exclusive to SELETAR CREEK, 4/5 Suffolks on the 

Right, and 5/5 Suffolks on the Left. The artillery support was to be provided

by a Right Group under Col Jephson consisting of 5 Field Regt RA (less B Troop 

63/81 Fd Bty) with 351 Fd Bty (Major Cornish) of 88 Fd Regt under command. 

As 88 Fd Regt had not arrived, 5 Field Regiment moved out of their positions on 

the PONGOL PENINSULAR, and occupied fresh ones to the South of the TAMPINES ROAD. 

A Left Group under Col D’Aubuz consisted of 88 Fd Regt, less 1 Bty, with B Troop 

63/81 Fd Bty and the 18 pdr Volunteer Battery under command took over the 

PONGOL area.

RHQ went to a light blue bungalow on the TAMPINES ROAD opposite 54 Inf Bde HQ. 
“A” Troop were allotted an estate road leading South from the 10 M.S.,73 Fd Bty a 
track from 12½ M.S., while 351 Fd Bty took a road leading from 8 M.S. 
“B” Troop 63/81 Fd Bty remained on the MATILDA ESTATE, and B Echelon stayed where 
it was.

On the coast were located some French 74mm guns, manned by the remains of 137 Fd 
Regt RA. They were aided by searchlights, and the Regimental OPs were sited
near them, to take advantage of the beams. The Coast line was in the form of an 
inverted horseshoe, with the right arm at FAIRY POINT CHANGI, where 2Lt Armstrong 
had an OP for D Troop; then two bungalows in the left half of the curve, where 75mm 
guns were, and finally an OP on the East side of the PONGOL peninsular at the ZOO.

69

Contact was made to the Right with the Coast Defence Fire Control Post at CHANGI 
and to the left with the Left Group OP at PONGOL POINT, about 1/4 mile away. 
Facing the Coast line was the island of PULAU UBIN about a mile away, This 
island was about 4 miles long, and was patrolled regularly. To the left of the 
island, the Mainland, about 1 mile away, was under good observation from the 
bungalow CPs and PONGOL.

As the Infantry had not arrived, and there was little chance of anything happening 
Capt Forbes, and Adjutant, who had practically lived on the end of a telephone 
for about a month, decided to take a night off. He suffered from insomnia, as he 
was always waiting for his old friend the telephone bell to ring! Just as well 
as a matter of fact, as when it did ring once, he was able to wake up the Duty 
Officer, who was certainly not suffering from the same complaint!

All plans had been made, and the guns nicely dug in, when the guns of 148 Fd
Regt started to arrive. Orders were received that 148 Fd Regt, and 3 Battery
Regt, were to take over the positions of 4 Field Regt; 5 Field Regiment were to 
be administered by CRA 8 Australian Division and come under command of 44 Indian
Infantry Brigade at JURONG. On looking at the map, JURONG was found to be about 
30 miles away right on the West side of the Island! To make the change-over 
easier, as many telephone wires as possible were left down, and new wire was to 
be handed over by 148 Fd Regt as soon as it arrived from the Docks. The equivalent 
value of twisted wire as against Single D III wire was amicably assessed by 
Col Jephson with his opposite number Col S W Harris, the Old Rugger International 
Wing Three-quarter.

About 0800 hrs on February 6th, B Troop 63/81 Fd Bty OP, with RSM Bishop and 
Signaller Herd, started shooting up enemy mortars from PONGOL OP. About 1100 hrs 
they were shelled by some high-velocity gun to the tune of about 64 rounds gunfire!
Recce parties moved on Feb 5th, and the Regiment on from Feb 6th. The JURONG area 
was found to be as crowded as usual, but as before the Regiment shoved its nose in.
“A” Troop 63/81 Fd Bty went into some trees on the road leading to PASIR LABAR 

FORT, North of JURONG. “B” Troop 63/81 Fd Bty were to the NW of the main road in a 
position it was very hard to occupy, owing to some very rickety bridges. D Troop 
73 Fd Bty were about 200 yds from RHQ, who had found themselves a place near the 
road, the North end of JURONG, close to Bde HQ, and “E” Troop 73 Fd Bty were near 
an old wireless station. An extra issue of tents was made from Ordnance, and the 
Regiment dug in again and made themselves as comfortable as possible, as they 
expected to be there some time.

70

63/81 Fd Bty took over the Right Sector OPs in the neighbourhood of PASIR LABAR 

FORT, on a small hill overlooking JURONG CREEK. 73 Fd Bty had an OP on the coast 
with a marvellous view of shipping approaching SINGAPORE. B Echelon went in a 
Rubber Estate at the South end of JURONG village, with an Indian Pioneer Bn under 
a cheerful ex-Cavalry major. He was most hospitable, and he was always on the lookout
for passers-by to share a beer with him in a large bus belonging to the 
Singapore Bus Coy, which his unit had acquired. It has a Frigidaire and the Wireless 
also worked! The Australian Brigade, supported by 2/10 and 2/15 Royal 
Australian Fd Regts was on the Sector to the Right, while that on the Left was 
under Singapore Fortress. 44 Ind Inf Bde were all Punjabi Bde under command 
of Brigadier Ballantyne, who had commanded a Punjab Regiment in Peshawar.

So began another partnership with the Royal Australian Artillery. Brigadier Callaghan, 
who was CRA at GEMAS, was sick, and his place was taken by Lt Col McEachern, who, 
with Major Hunt, the Brigade Major, and Capt Johnstone, the Staff Capatin, did all 
they could to help. Div HQ RA was at D’SOUSA ROAD and MARGARET ROAD about 6 miles 
East of JURONG. The joke about this Headquarters was that to visit HQ RA you went 
IN by the OUT entrance to see Margaret, and came OUT by the IN entrance of D’Sousa!

The Fate of the 22 Indian Infantry Brigade

On Jan 27th, Major General Barstow held a conference, in which he explained that he 
had received orders from General Gordon-Bennett, commanding West Force, as to the 
withdrawal to SINGAPORE. Brigadier Maxwell’s Australian Brigade was to use the 
West road, with its right flank covered by 8 and 22 Indian Infantry Brigades, who 
would be withdrawing on foot, along the line of the railway. All vehicles were to
be sent to SINGAPORE by road, including Artillery, carriers, signals and ambulances. 
8 and 33 Ind Inf Bde were to occupy successive sectors marked on the map, by and 
up to the time laid down, with one Brigade in the line, and the 
other resting. The withdrawal would be controlled by mutual arrangements between 
Brigadiers. 22 Ind Inf Bde would occupy the first sector that night. From 
previous reconnaissance, it was obvious that the sectors bore no relation to 
possible defensive positions, as the sectors could easily be outflanked by roads 
fit for MT. The best defensive position was just South of LAYANG LAYANG. This 
was pointed out, but the Divisional Commander had received implicit verbal orders 
from General Gordon-Bennett, and they could not be changed.

As a result, a position was taken up with 5/11 Sikhs in front, and 2/18 RGR and 
2/12 FF Regt further back along the railway, covering a cross track, which led into 
the Australian area, and which had to be denied to a certain hour. The Right 
Flank was open, however, and only the presence of 8 Ind Inf Bde in the LAYANG 

LAYANG Area would prevent the railway from being cut behind 22 Ind Inf Bde. As a 
matter of fact, 8 Ind Inf Bde went into the area initially but moved back during 
the night thus enabling the enemy, moving by MT, to get between the two Brigades, 

71

and to occupy LAYANG LAYANG.

At dawn on Jan 28th, two Brigade Patrols of 1 Coy 5/11 Sikhs and 1 Coy 2/12 FF Regt 
went out, and contacted the enemy MT, parked, inflicted heavy casualties and 
withdrew, but were followed up. At 1000 hrs, the Brigade started withdrawing West 
of the Railway, hoping to contact 8 Ind Inf Bde, and to attack LAYANG LAYANG from 
the East. By 1200 hrs, the vanguard of 5/11 Sikhs came under fire from what proved 
to be a strong ambush across the Railway. The Sikhs put up a stout show, and the 
enemy were driven East of the Railway.

There were now two alternatives:

a. to move on LAYANG LAYANG, attack the village, and then turn right and
continue along the Railway.

b. to move across country, keeping East of the Railway, with the object of 
contacting 8 Ind Inf Bde, and continuing the withdrawal as ordered.

The second course was decided, as it would involve less casualties, and there 
were no facilities for evacuating wounded. There was only one map available, and 
this failed to show the dense jungle overgrowing the tracks shown. It soon 
became a matter of compass bearing and hacking the way with kukris.

Next morning, the Brigade Intelligence Officer was sent forward to try and contact 
8 Ind Inf Bde. He did so, but much further South than anticipated, and he could 
not rejoin. By nightfall on 29th January, the Brigade were very tired, and 
without food, the Supply by railway being impossible. The country consisted of 
hills and deep ravines, covered with jungle. At daylight, on January 30th, the edge 
of the jungle was reached, with pineapple and lalang grass, and a hill ahead, which 
proved to be BUKIT HONTA. In spite of great exhaustion, a conference was held on 
the top, though not before Brigadier Painter had collapsed from fatigue.

The march was continued and, by the evening, more rubber country was reached, but 
there were still no signs of 8 Ind Inf Bde, and locals reported that Japanese troops 
were billeted in the area. At dusk, a Chinese guide was obtained who led first 
along the railway, and then through the rubber. No map was now available. Whenever 
a halt was ordered, officers and men fell asleep where they sat, from sheer 
exhaustion. After one such half, a company of 5/11 Sikhs was found to be missing, 
having, presumably, not received the signal to move on.

At last, at about 1130 hrs, on January 31st, it was decided, with great reluctance 
to leave the wounded behind at a rubber estate dispensary, owing to the exhaustion 
of the bearers. All unnecessary equipment was burned, also the mortars. The 
Brigade Signal Officer was sent on to try and make contact, but failed to do so and 
was captured.

72

On Feb 1st, the march was resumed and at 1030 hrs Japanese Troops were met, who 
extended in a wide circle, and opened fire. Through exhaustion, a proper attack 
could not be made, and what was left of 2/12 FF Regt and a number of men of the
5/11 Sikhs were captured. The remainder, with the remnants of 2/18 RGR succeeded
in disengaging themselves, and continued an orderly withdrawal, and the enemy did 
not follow up. A fresh guide was procured, and eventually a halt was called in 
a rubber plantation, about 4 miles North of the bridge over the TEBRAU River. Locals
reported the Japanese had occupied JOHORE BHARU and that the railway bridge was 
destroyed at TEBRAU.

Some vehicles had been found and Col Parkin was told to push on, and report on 
the state of the bridge. Finding the bridge blown, he made for the Coast and
reached SINGAPORE ISLAND. During his absence, a guide turned up who offered to 
lead the remainder to JOHORE BHARU by tracks, and Bde HQ and about 300 2/18 RGR 
set out. They reached the offices of the rubber plantation at TEBRAU, and heard
from locals that the Japanese were all round, and that the British had retired 
to the Island, and had blown up the Causeway.

On the evening of Feb 1st, at a talk with Col Hartigan, it was realised that the
ammunition had nearly all been fired, and that the men were really too exhausted
to be capable of serious fighting. Having carefully weighed up all considerations, 
the Brigadier was forced to come to the conclusion that surrender was the
only course to adopt.  All officers, who had no men for whom they were responsible,
were permitted to split up into small parties, in the hope of escaping notice, 

and reaching the Island. Most officers took advantage of the offer, and reached 
the coast, and were taken across by Naval patrols, who were on the look out for 
survivors. Major Davidson and Capt Harvey remained with Brigadier Painter. Here, 
the story of 22 Ind Inf Bde ends, but they will never be forgotten by 5 Field 
Regt RA. Had other units in the Garrison of SINGAPORE shown the same courage, 
determination and general efficiency, the future might well have been different.

Mention should be made of Major General Barstow. He had gone forward with Col 
Trott, his A/Q and another officer, to the Railway Bridge, previously mentioned 
as being blown up. Suddenly a number of Japanese came out of a wood, and called 
on them to surrender. The General ran down the left side of the embankment, and 
was never seen again. Col Trott and other officer went to the right, bolted 
into the wood and escaped. As General Barstow never turned up at any Prisoner 
of War Camp, he must have been killed.

Landing of the Japanese

The Causeway at JOHORE BHARU had been crossed on Jan 31st, and probably blown up, 
the Argylls having the honour of being the last troops to cross. Considerable

73

activity had been observed on the Mainland, but Artillery fire had been discouraged 
“for fear of damaging JOHORE Property”! Enemy batteries had gone into action 
opposite our Sector, and a flash-spotting service was put into operation by the
OPs, and likely positions were shelled, after comparing the cross-intersections 
with the contours on the map. It may be said now, that throughout the operations, 
the maps issued were excellent, though the map of SINGAPORE itself suffered from 
having too much detail, and was very difficult to read.

All the spare ammunition had been brought over from the old positions, and was now 
in the Wagon Lines at JURONG. Malaya Command had ordered various ammunition depots 
to take it in, and, the RASC to provide lorries, but nobody took the slightest 
notice and eventually B Echelon carried out  the move itself, assisted by 4 lorries 
from an Australian Anti-Tank Regt. Had Command shown any foresight, a dump would 
have been started well in rear. As it was, the dumps indicated were much too far 
forward, and were already full to overflowing, if one had to believe the words of 
the officers in charge.

On the night of February 6th and during the late afternoon of the 7th, the Japanese 
Artillery fire increased in intensity, and some sort of barrage appeared to be in 
progress, as it went up and down the front, held by the Australians on our right, 
like a thunderstorm. There had also been a lot of bombing during the day. Huge 
clouds of black smoke hung over the Northern part of the Island, as Naval Oil tanks 
at KRANJI and the NAVAL BASE were set on fire. The enemy had been trying to hit an 
observer post on a bare hill in front of Divisional HQ, but had failed to do so.

About 2200 hrs, a message came to RHQ that some boats had been seen by RSM Bishop
at the Right hand OP, and had been engaged by gunfire.* Some had been hit, and 
the remainder had pushed off further North. During the night, there was very 
heavy rifle gunfire to the North East, SOS  signals were seen going up, and a 
big attack seemed to be in progress. About 0200 hrs, we learnt that unsuccessful 
attempts had been made East of the Causeway, out along the Causeway itself, and 
all the attackers had been wiped out. Two other attempts were made, before a
bridgehead was formed on the Australian Brigade Front in the swamps.

There were no definite details the following morning. About 1000 hrs, an officer 
came into Brigade HQ saying that the Commander of PASIR LABAR FORT had been killed, 
that both 6” guns were out of action, and that the whole garrison of a Malay Bn
and Hongkong-Singapore Brigade had evacuated the Fort, and were streaming down 
the road. As this news seemed rather alarming, Col Jephson ordered Major Fennell 
to take a few NCOs up the road, and see what was happening and try and rally the 
fleeing defenders. Major Fennell borrowed a tin hat, and set off with Sgt Price, 
Bdr Hoare, with L/Bdr McGee at the wheel of the truck: about a mile beyond “D” 
Troop position, they met 8 gunners of the HKS with a Havildar. They were asked 

74

where they were going, and they said that their gun had been blown up, and they 
had been told to go to another position.

Imagining them to be the Advanced Guard of a retreating host, they were packed into 
the back of the truck and taken back up the road. A little further on, a low flying 
plane showed interest in the proceedings, and the party dived into a wood. When 
the time came to re-embark, the extra passengers had disappeared. They saw no 
signs of anybody until a lorry came along. Major Fennell stopped the lorry, and 
got much the same reply. “Well Sir! We belong to the Searchlights. The Malay Bn 
‘ave been running round their barracks, and ‘as gone. There aint nobody there, so 
we dismantled our Searchlight, and Sgt told us to ‘op it!” They then continued to 
‘op it!

As it was getting near the Fort, and the road was rather open, the truck was left 
behind, and the party crept forward like Red Indians.

Revolvers were drawn, and visions of DSOs, DCMs, - or a Japanese bullet swam before 
their eyes! Would the Japs be there already, or would the Fort be empty, with the 
dead propped against the embrasures, like at Fort Zinderneuf in Beau Geste! 
They rounded the last corner stealthily, and heard an extraordinary noise. Not 
shouts of “Banzai”, or even the screams of wounded men! Someone was actually 
playing English Dance Music on a gramophone, and the place was swarming with 
Indian Troops and Malays.

The truck was called up, and drove to the front door of the Fort. There they met 
Capt Monks of the Malay Bn, and told him what had been reported. “Bloody nonsense” 
said he “Come and have a beer and a conducted tour”. True that the 6 inch guns 
had had direct hits, and were useless, but the machine gun posts were all manned 
by the Malay Bn, and there were two platoons of Punjabis. So ended the great 
Adventure, and the party returned to RHQ.

On the evening of Feb 8th, a short withdrawal was made, as the new front line 
was to run through JURONG. “D” Troop were extricated with some difficulty as the 
enemy were very close. 44 Bde HQ was at the old Divisional HQ near BUKIT TIMAH,
and the Regiment were in action along side-roads between there and JURONG, and 
B Echelon went to ADAM ROAD, and later to the BOTANICAL GARDENS. 

Events round Bukit Timah

ON Feb 10th, there was a lot of bombing, artillery, and mortar fire, going to to 
the right flank, which looked as if the main attack was coming up the BUKIT TIMAH 

ROAD from the CAUSEWAY. 44 Ind Inf Bde had been ordered to move SW towards the 
coast at PASIR PANJANG village, and their place was taken by 15th Bde under 
Brigadier Coates, with Major Gauvain as BM. This was a mixed British and Indian 
75

Brigade. Lt Bladen was Liaison Officer with 15th Bde, and had got a wireless 
truck in communication with Capt Ratcliffe, who had an OP near BUKIT TIMAH 
village, which was burning fiercely.

Late in the afternoon, the Regt was told to come under Southern Area, but this 
was cancelled. A successful Counter-attack had been put in by 3 Indian Corps on 
the right, and 15th Bde were to attack the following morning . “A” Troop went to 
its old position on the JURONG road some 2 miles N of BUKIT TIMAH with “B” Troop 
in action South of BUKIT TIMAH Railway Bridge. RHQ moved to a Chinese Bungalow 
near SWISS CLUB ROAD and, about 2300 hrs, Major Bland, with Lt Bladen, 2Lt McKenzie 
and BSM Cooper went to 15 Bde HQ, which was in the dugouts where 44 Ind Inf Bde 
had been.

On Feb 11th, Lt Bladen and 2Lt McKenzie set off in the dark, at 0430 hrs, in the 
Bde Signal Truck, with a Sgt, who was to lead them to Bn HQs of the 6/17 Dogras 
and 6/14 Punjab Regt. On the way up, they met some Leicesters streaming down 
the JURONG ROAD trying to reform. Their Colonel said that there had been a 
breakthrough, and that he was out of communication with the 6/14 Punjab Regt, but 
was going to form up and occupy a position near BUKIT TIMAH. On learning this, 
they decided to go back and tell Brigadier Coates at Bde HQ. Major Bland went into 
the Brigade Office, and they never saw him again. 

At dawn on Feb 11th, there was a lot of rifle and machine gun fire on the right 
flank. The Employment Platoon took up positions. The Brigade Major dashed out 
of the dugout, got shot in the leg, and shouted to them to withdraw towards the 
Leicesters. Lt Bladen and 2Lt McKenzie saw some enemy tanks coming over a rise 
to the right. As they only had revolvers, they decided to hop it pretty quick, 
and set off SSW of JURONG. They saw some Japanese digging in. They were shot at, 
so turned of West again, and reached REFORMATORY ROAD, passed some huts which had 
been used as barracks, crossed the Railway through a drain, and found themselves 
in HOLLAND ROAD. They got a lift there, saw a Regimental Signal Section truck 
soon after, got into it, fell asleep and woke up in RHQ in the Tiny Tots 
Clinic in THOMLINSON ROAD.

Much had been happening in the meanwhile. During the night, the rifle and mortar 
fire had been close to RHQ, and much more intense; it was decided to withdraw to 
a house, previously reconnoitred in THOMLINSON ROAD quite close to the Australian 
RA HQ. The Chinese bungalow was left with regret, as it had a very pretty garden 
with marble seats just to fit two and might have been a “Love Nest” belonging to 
somebody! Col Jephson had found some cherry brandy, which all drank, and may have 
caused this rosy outlook!

The vehicles started to leave about 0300 hrs. The Signal Section with Lt Marsden 
stayed behind, while the cookhouse was being packed up. They and the CO2 left 
about a quarter of an hour later. On emerging from the drive into the BUKIT TIMAH

76

ROAD, a tall officer came up, described himself as Brigade Major 12 Bde and 
asked how many  men with rifles were available. “The Japs have broken into BUKIT 

TIMAH with tanks” he said" Our Anti tank guns have laid out two, but there are 
still some left, and there are no infantry to protect the two Anti tank guns 
here, and also some Artillery. Can you help?” “Righto” said the CO2, and told 
Lt Marsden to go about a quarter of a mile down the road with the trucks and 
then bring the men back with some rifles.

On the right of the road, were two Anti-Tank guns manned by Australians. On 
the left were three guns of “B” Troop, about 100 yds behind each other on the 
roadside, with Capts Pearson and Hunt at 2Lt Hogshaw. They were in an Anti Tank 
role. The Signal Section and the CO2’s driver and batman were put, partly in a 
ditch near the leading gun, and partly on the edge of the deep drain to the left 
of the road. Two more men were placed at a gate leading into the yard of a 
small Factory with orders to watch the left flank.

About half a mile away just outside BUKIT TIMAH village, an enemy tank was 
burning fiercely, and behind it, buildings in the village were still smouldering 
and, now and again, flames would shoot up. The Supply Depot on BUKIT TIMAH 
Rifle Range was also on fire, and occasionally dense clouds of black smoke blew 
across the road. The little party talked together in whispers. There were long 
periods of silence, and then suddenly there were bursts of rifle and machine gun 
fire away to the right. The chief question to be answered was “Who would 
arrive first?” The Jap tanks in front, the Japs to the Right rear, or the 
Reconnaissance Battalion from SINGAPORE?

About 0500 hrs, after what had seemed like 2 years, six armoured cars went by 
towards the village. There was a terrific explosion and some firing, and then 
two of them came back with one towing the other. About half an hour later, Col 
Fitte of the Reconnaissance Battalion (18 Div) arrived about 1/4 mile in rear 
with some carriers, and the situation was explained to him by Capt Pearson. He 
said “I don’t want any Artillery here, you had better withdraw”. When the 
message reached Capt. Hunt, he was most indignant, and so was the Australian 
Lieutenant in charge of the Anti Tank guns. “Aren’t we going to stay here and 
fight it out with the bastards?” Said he. We had all got so heartily sick of 
orders being given to withdraw, that this order was queried three times. 
Eventually, “B” Troop withdrew, and went into action in CLUNY ROAD.

By now it was quite light, and streams of infantry were seen coming forward. 
Col Fitte and Col Thomas of the Northumberland Fusiliers were at the junction of 

SWISS CLUB ROAD and BUKIT TIMAH ROAD, and it was under these circumstances that 
THOMFORCE was formed. As no Artillery had been allotted to them, owing to the 
emergency, Major Fennell told Capt Pearson to remain with Col Thomas, and to bring 

77

The rest of “B” Troop into action. This gave  him “A” Troop in FARRAR ROAD, and 
“B” Troop in the rubber alongside DUNEARN ROAD. As more ammunition was wanted, 
Major Fennell went back to fetch up a lorry, and also to report to RHQ what was 
happening. He could not find 63/81 Fd Bty Wagon Lines of 63/81 Field Battery RA, 
but came across the Wagon Lines of 73 Fd Bty near a Biscuit Factory, and borrowed 
a 3 tonne from them.

When he got back, he found Capt Pearson with Col Thomas at the junction of the RACE 

COURSE ROAD and DENEARN ROAD. Just by them were two derelict armoured cars 
“Auld Reekie” and “Inverness Castle”. “Auld Reekie” had evidently been bombed, and 
the driver was lying beside it with a gaping wound in his back. On the other side, 
the body of an Australian Major was being taken out of a carrier, which had also 
been hit. His face was blue, and the back of his head was horribly injured. 
After seeing that Capt Pearson was quite happy, the CO2 went back to RHQ.

We will now follow the fortunes of THOMFORCE. It consisted of a Battalion of
Norfolks, a Battalion of The Foresters, and the Recce Battalion. They had been 
given orders to hold the road at all costs and, if possible, to retake BUKIT 

TIMAH. The force attacked up the line of the main road with the Foresters on the 
Left, Norfolks on the Right, Recce Bn in the Centre. Owing to the close nature 
of the country it was arranged that Artillery support would be provided on orders 
given by Col Thomas, as a result of reports received. By noon, little progress 
had been made, and it was obvious that the enemy were in greater strength than had 
been at first suspected. The Norfolks in particular were sustaining a lot of 
casualties. Shortly afterwards, a mixed crowd of Leicesters and E Surreys, who 
formed a composite Bn, appeared on the left flank of the Foresters and said that 
they had been told to make their way back as best as they could; though where 
to nobody knew. From this it appeared that there were no units on the left flank.

General Percival, the GOC, then arrived, and gave orders that the Force was to 
occupy a Perimeter Camp on the RACECOURSE for the night. As there was no room for 
the guns on the RACECOURSE itself, “B” Troop went into a Perimeter with the 
Suffolks about 1000^x to the East. During the night, harassing fire tasks were 
carried out by the Battery on BUKIT TIMAH village and the RIFLE RANGE. By about 
0500 hrs, it was obvious, from rifle and automatic fire, that the RACECOURSE 
perimeter was surrounded by the Japanese. When it was light, Capt Pearson 
ordered “B” Troop to come into action alongside “A” Troop, who had moved to the 

BOTANICAL GARDENS during the night. Shortly afterwards Brigadier Massey-Beresford 
of 18 Div met Capt Hunt, learnt he was in touch with THOMFORCE, and used the 
Battery line to give orders to THOMFORCE to withdraw to the line of ADAM ROAD, also 
saying that he had been shot at by a Japanese post between RACE COURSE ROAD and 

ADAM ROAD. Col Thomas then ordered a general withdrawal to the line of ADAM ROAD 

warning Capt Pearson that a Jap tank was sitting at the corner of RACE COURSE ROAD.

78