Unit diaries relating to service of Geoffrey W. Fennell - Wallet 1 - Part 6

''Prince of Wales'' and ''Repulse'' had been sent up the East Coast to assist the 

garrison at KOTA BHARU and to make havoc with the enemy convoys. They had no 
air escort. They were spotted by enemy aircraft and heavily atacked with 

bombs and aerial topedoes. In spite of a gallant defence put up by the Anti-Aircraft 

defences, both ships were sunk. A lucky bomb damaged the steering 

gear of "Prince of Wales", which made her an easy target.

Meanwhile, a very heavy attack was launched on the JITRA LINE by the Japanese 

Guards Division and the 5th Division. All the Battalions stood firm and 

inflicted heavy casualties save one, who broke, and the Japanese who were 

always ready to exploit success, poured through the gap. Owing to scarcity of  

troops no really effective counter attack was possible, and a withdrawal was 

ordered. A landing was made at PENANG, coupled with bombing and the island 

was captured. 
The next stand was along the line of the KRIAN RIVER, running to the NORTH of
PERAK, but a further withdrawal became necessary. As the Perak river country was 
no good, the next stand was made at KAMPAR, and the Japs were held up for 3 days 

until they turned the flank by a landing on the coast at TELOK ANSON, and the 

defenders were forced to retire to the SLIM RIVER, 40 miles due South of IPOH, 

where another stand was to be made. 
Here the Japanese tanks again came into action. The jungle on either side 

of the road had been mined, but for some extraordinary reason, no demolitions had 

been made on the main road and the Tanks broke through and ran amok in the back 

areas. Two Infantry Brigades suffered very heavy casualties, and 137 Field Regt 

was wiped out, except for one Battery, which was at TANJONG MALIM, 155 Field Regt 
also suffered heavily.
Other landings were made on the Coast, and first PORT SWETTENHAM, the port of 

KUALA LUMPUR, and then PORT DICKSON, in NEGRI SEMBILAN, were evacuated. The 

Japanese tactics were still to keep up strong pressure from the front, and then 

to make further landings in rear of any positions taken up. A large landing 

was made at the mouth of the MUAR RIVER in JOHORE. 53 Bde, of the 18 Division, 

which had just arrived ahead of the remainder of the Division after being at sea 

for 3 months, were sent to BATU PAHAT. 45 Indian Infantry Brigade, just arrived 

from India, went to MUAR, were flung into the Battle, and badly cut up.

All through this withdrawal, the 11 Indian Division were badly outnumbered and 

the Japanese had complete Air and Sea supremacy. The Gurkha Brigade covered 

with glory, and showed that, whereas the Japanese would face machine gun 

fire with almost fanatic disregard for life, they became demoralised when it came to 

hand to hand fighting with bayonet and kukri. The Argylls, also, made a name for 

themselves which will never be forgotten.
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It was this unbroken series of disasters on the West Coast that caused the

continued withdrawal of the 9th Indian Division "in order to conform".

It was generally understood by us that 3 Indian Corps would join up with the

Australians, and hold a previously reconnoitred and prepared line from 
MERSING-KLUANG-BATU PAHAT on the West Coast. Nothing had been done, which seems quite 

inexcusable considering the thousands of Chinese and Tamil coolies, which must 
have been available. It certainly appeared to the retreating forces that Malaya 
Command was quite content to remain in FORT CANNING, SINGAPORE, and refuse to 
exercise any foresight. This may be an unjust statement, but certainly the 
first visit made to Malaya Command by Major Fennell, on arrival of the Regiment 
in SINGAPORE, did nothing to dispel this allusion! Anyhow, by the time the troops 

had arrived from the North, the Japanese had very sensibly made a landing in 
force at BATU PAHAT!
NOTE: These operations are dealt with more fully in the appendix, where an 

account is given of a lecture by Sir Lewis Heath, the Corps Commander. 

The Lecture was not given until after this History had been written.
73rd FIELD BATTERY IN KELANTAN

The time has now come to describe the adventures of 73rd Field Battery RA in KELANTAN 
and elsewhere. On Dec 3rd, the Battery marched to KUALA LUMPUR and stayed there 
the night. The next night, 2/3 of the Battery left by train, the Railway Authorities 
being unable to get the whole Battery away on one train. The Code Word "MATADOR" 
had gone out, meaning that our Forces were to be ready to advance into THAILAND, 
and much rolling stock had to be rushed North. In spite of this, the train the 
Railway authorities did produce, was the longest that had ever run in Malaya! 
In spite of the orders given by the Railway and the DOME, the wheels had not been 

taken off the Spiders, nor had any superstructures to be removed. The remainder 
of the Battery, mostly B Echelon, followed next day. It was understood that KOTA 
BHARU would be the final destination, but a road led to it from KUALA KRAI. 
The Battery detrained at KUALA KRAI, and went into huts in CHONDONG CAMP about 
midday on Dec 5th. The next 2 days were spent in feverish reconnaissance with the 
Infantry of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.
At 0100 hrs on the morning of Dec 8th, the Battery was awakened by the sound of 
gunfire. A few minutes later, we received confirmation that the Japanese were 

shelling the beaches off KOTA BHARU, and the Battery were ordered to "stand to". 

This was managed in 45 minutes though all the ammunition was on the ground and had 

to be reloaded.
At 0400 hrs, the Battery was ordered to rendezvous at KOTA BHARU, and arrived 

there at 0500 hrs. It remained there all the morning, wondering how the battle 

was going, and it was not until 1330 hrs that D troop were ordered into action.
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They were closely followed by E Troop, the whole Battery being in action South 

of the aerodrome. One OP was sent out and manned by Capt MacEwen who joined up 

with 21st Mountain Battery (less 1 Section at KUANTAN) on the beach at SABAK.

The Battle went on all day, and well into the evening, the fighting being very 

much of a dog-fight. During the afternoon, the RAAF or what remained of it, 

left the aerodrome. The gun positions were machine-gunned from the air, a new 

experience for most of the detachmens, and all ranks took it very well. Major 

Don, Captain Brynford-Jones, and one or two others, set fire to 250,000 gallons 

of Aviation spirit, which had been left behind on the aerodrome. It was useless 

from the motor vehicle point of view.

By 1600 hrs, the enemy had captured two pill-boxes, and had gained a firm footing 

on the land. At 2100 hrs, the Brigade was ordered to withdraw. A certain amount 

of confusion attended this withdrawal, as the order was not received by all units. 
At 2200 hrs, the Battery withdrew to a RV about 4 miles South of KOTA BHARU. 

Capt MacEwen and his OP party had quite an exciting time getting back across the river, 

which was about 80 yards wide, with quite a swift current. They went down to the river 

with the Officer of the 21st Mountain Battery, and made their plans. The officer 

of the Mountain Battery explained to the Sikhs of his party that, if they could 

not swim, they were to help themselves along by holding onto the OP Bty telephone 

wire, which was firmly tied back on to the banks. The Sikhs said they were 

frightened to swim.

Capt MacEwen told the Mountain Gunner that he remembered seeing a boat tied to 

the bank further down the stream, but did not think it would hold everybody. 

They found the boat, after a bit of trouble, as it was pitch dark and raining 

heavily, and all piled in, hoping for the best. No oars could be found, but there 

was a long 10ft pole. Bdr Trew manipulated the pole and pushed out into mid-stream. 

The boat was caught by the current and carried downstream at about 4 knots.

Further down the river was a floating footbridge, which had been blown in half 

by the Sappers. They continued their course downstream, the pole-man no longer 

being able to connect with the bottom of the river, and bumped into the Northern 

half of the bridge. The gap blown by the Sappers was about 20ft wide. They 

pushed themselves along the bridge, the idea being to shoot the gap and get to 

the other half of the bridge. The current was too strong however, and they were 

carried on through the gap, still out of control. They then tried to paddle 

with rifle butts. After about 10 minutes, they ran into the trees overhanging 

the far bank.
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There was only one possible landing point that Capt MacEwen knew of in the 

vicinity. This was about 50 yards upstream, so they pulled themselves there by 

means of the tree branches, and at last got ashore. This point was guarded by 

a section of the 1/13 Frontier Force Regt, with a machine gun. They fired a 

rifle shot at them, but Capt MacEwen managed to convince them that they were 

friends, and they allowed them to land.  The Sikh signallers then came to life 

and, while the boat was being tied up by Capt MacEwen and Sig Daley, they pinched 

their telephone and disappeared into the darkness!!  Good scrounging no doubt, 

but hardly good manners!

During the battle, targets mainly consisted of shooting at Japanese approaching 

the shore in small boats, and a kind of landing barge.  After the capture of the 

pillboxes, 30 rounds gunfire was put down on the area.  Although there was an 

unaccountable delay in receiving Fire Orders immediately on going into action, 

an Area Concentration Target was finally received by DR and the CPO divided it 

between D and E Troops and rounds of gunfire, up to as many as 30 rounds, were 

put down on SABAK and the adjoining headland.

On Dec 9th the enemy having gained their objective, namely the aerodrome, did not 

press the advantage gained the previous night.  8 Ind Inf Bde withdrew and took 

up a position South of a road running East and West some 13 miles South of KOTA 

BHARU.  The Battery was in support of 4/19 Hyderabad Regt, and found a position 

near CHONDONG CAMP.  As this was the only possible position, both troops had to 

go into action very nearly wheel to wheel!

That night a considerable number of rounds were fired on Map Reference Targets. 

Fire continued intermittently during the next day, but very little was heard 

from the enemy.  He was up to his usual tricks, finding where the flanks were, and 

then working round them.  On the evening of December 10th, orders for a retirement 

were issued, and 4/19 Hyderabad Regt, supported by RT Section D Troop, covered 

the withdrawal. This Battalion withdrew about midnight. The Battery withdrew 

about 8 miles and halted by the side of the road.

On Dec 11th, the withdrawal was continued.  RT Section D Troop went into action 
several times, but no rounds were fired.  At 1500 hrs the rearguard was halted 

owing to a bridge having been blown prematurely by a Sapper Havildar, after 

the main body had crossed.  The 9/19 Hyderabad Regt, 1 Troop Armoured Cars (3 Cavalry) 

the section of guns, were cut off from the Bde for nearly 24 hours. That night, 

a shooting flap started, which lasted most of the night.One Battalion, in the main 

body, even started mortaring the Section, thinking they were the enemy, although 

they must have known that we were on the other side of the river.  They did some 

nasty damage. This flap resulted in Bdr Bembridge being killed.  He was buried 

in the garden of the Police Station at MACHANG.
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On Dec 12th, the rest of the Brigade took up a position about 1/2 mile South 
of the bridge. By 1200 hrs, the Sappers had made a crossing and the rearguard 
was able to rejoin the main body. The position the Brigade was holding was just 
in front of the edge of a wood about 26 miles from KOTA BHARU.  In front of the 
position was about 1 mile of padi fields before reaching the next wood.  This 
was the first time the Battery was able to do any reasonable observed shooting.

The enemy pushed in quite a strong attack, supported by two guns or mortars. 
This was the first time their Artillery had been heard of. The guns were of 
small calibre and high velocity. The Battery shelled several likely gun 
positions, and it was thought that one gun was hit, for they never fired with 
more than one gun afterwards.  The Brigade withdrew, but the rearguard, supported 
by D Troop, held the position for another hour. The Rearguard took up another 
position about 6 miles further South, and were supported by the whole Battery. 

This position was held during the night and most of the next day.

The Brigade had prepared a defensive position about 4 miles behind the rearguard 
and later, on Dec 13th, were joined by the Rearguard. The Battery went into 
action in a Rubber Estate, the guns being in position in the clearing round the 
Manager's bungalow.  The bungalow was still being occupied, although the Manager 
was not there himself.  The officers were entertained to a very nice dinner, 
Roast Turkey being the main course.  The Battery remained here for two days, and 
a comparatively pleasant time was spent.  Major General Barstow, commanding 
9 Indian Division visited the Brigade during this period.  Several attacks were 
beaten off, but a slight withdrawal was made on the 15th.

On Dec 15th, the Battery moved from Peddy's bungalow in the afternoon, and went 
into positions in the area of 42 M.S. further south.  About this time, the GOC 
decided to evacuate KELANTAN to conform with happenings on the West Coast.  On 
Dec 16th, orders were received to entrain and go to KUALA LIPIS.  D Troop and 
part of B Echelon went first.

There was a lot of air activity on the 17th and 18th, the enemy made a strong 
attack around both flanks, and a number of targets were engaged during the 
morning by E Troop.  The afternoon was quiet, but at 1600 hrs the party 
started again and firing was continuous until time for evacuation at 2100 hrs.  The 
Battery finished in a blaze of glory and fired 48 rounds gunfire before entraining 
at 2200 hrs.

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E Troop joined D Troop on a rubber estate about 10 miles SW of KUALA LIPIS. 

The Manager of the Estate, a Frenchman M. Maria-Lube, looked after the Battery 

very well. Every man got beer and also, what was needed most of all, a wash. 

He gave the officers a very fine dinner. Dec 20th was a day of rest and recuperation, 
but on Dec 21st a move was made at 170 hrs for KUALA LUMPUR, which was 

reached at 0100 hrs on the 22nd. Later in the day, orders were received to go to 

KLANG and come under command of L of C Area, and the move was completed on the 

23rd, involving a march of some 30 miles by road.

Adventures in Klang

At Klang, the Battery came under command of O/C NEGRI SEMBILAN Battalion. 

This Battalion consisted of Malaya, officered by Europeans, mostly planters. A 

parachutist scare stated almost immediately after arrival, but this proved to be 

a false alarm, and the Battery returned to its hide the following day. Dec 24th 

was spent by all officers in reconnaissance. The Battalion was responsible for 

about 70 miles of coastline from KUALA SELANGOR to MORIB. Bn HQ was at PORT 

SWETTENHAM. The Battery zone was divided into 2 parts, from exclusive PORT 

SWETTENHAM to KUALA SELANGOR, and from inclusive PORT SWETTENHAM to MORIB. D Troop 

was allotted to the Northern, and E Troop to the Southern stretch.

As previously stated, the day was spent in reconnaissances. On his reconnaissance, 

Capt MacEwen and his OP party had the good luck to be on the spot when a Jap 

fighter plane crashed. They were guided to the exact spot by a Malay, and found 

the pilot alive and took him prisoner. The pilot begged MacEwen to shoot him as 

he said he could never return to Japan after having been captured. Capt MacEwen 

brought him back, handed him over and relieved him of his revolver, which later 

was used to arm the Doctor.

The Christmas Day Dinner was held in the Masonic Hall at KLANG. With the help 

of Mr Witham, a Volunteer Officer attached to the Battery for liaison purposes, 

the makings of quite a good dinner were collected. As at KUANTAN, the day passed 

peaceably as the Japanese had evidently other matters of importance to attend 

to. Dec 27th to 30th was spent by all officers in liaison with the local 

Europeans (Sounds good to me! Ed). On the night of the 28th,  Malay Volunteer 

Battery of 4 18 pdrs, under Major Wilshaw, arrived, and one section was sent up 

North to join RT Section D Troop who had left for their sector the day before. 

The Battery Fighting Command Post was set up in PORT SWETTENHAM at BnHQ, with a 

rear Command Post at KLANG with direct communication between the two and the 

NEGRI-SEMBILAN Bn. B Echelon remained at KLANG. There were 2 OPs in each 

sector. On Dec 31st and Jan 1st, a spot was found from which one gun at a time 

could be calibrated firing out to sea.

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On January 2nd D Troop OP at KUALA SELANGOR spotted some craft well out to sea 

about 1400 hrs. The OP was up the lighthouse and Capt MacEwen and Bdr D'Arcy, 

the OPA decided to camouflage themselves by wearing sarongs! RT Section D Troop 

and the 18 pdr Section were brought into action on the Fort position just below 

the lighthouse. The Left Section was sent from KLANG. The ships by this time 

were about 4000 yds from the shore and could be seen clearly. There was a cargo 

boat of about 1500 tons and about 10 motor launches packed with Japanese. 

They were heading for the river mouth. The cargo boat stopped, and the motor 

launches came on. Fire was opened when they were 200 yds from the shore. It was 

a very nice easy shoot over open sights at very slow-moving targets. Two of 

them received direct hits, and the remainder turned about and made out to sea. 

Several salvos were fired at the parent ship, which had also turned round, and 

was making off. Two hits were scored, and a fire started in the stern, which 

burnt for about half an hour. By this time, they were out of range. Another 

of the motor launches must have been hit by a splinter, for it sank, and we saw 

them picking up survivors.

This landing was supported by one fighter plane, which machine-gunned the lighthouse 

and later one of our trucks coming up the main road. Capt Brynford-Jones 

was hit, and died about an hour later. His death was felt keenly by everyone in 

the Battery, and also in the remainder of the Regiment when the news came 

through. He left a gap which still remains unfilled. His cry in the Mess of 

"What about a game of "Yonk" boys" will long be remembered. Nothing was ever 

too much trouble for him, and the men would do anything for him.

Jan 3rd, 4th and 5th proved uneventful except that on Jan 3rd, Lt C J Carper ^COOPER RA 

rejoined the Regiment from his appointment of Staff Lieut RA at 9 Indian Division 

HQ. There were reports of a Japanese landing about 60 miles North up the Coast. 

On Jan 6th, the Japanese advance party reached KUALA SELANGOR. There had been a 

certain amount of fire on a village, reported to be occupied the night before, 

and it had been burnt down. About lunch time, D Troop were ordered to rejoin 

the Battery at KLANG. D Troop was relieved by F Troop 464 Fd Bty RA, from 

88 Fd Regt RA.

On Jan 10th, both troops went into action South of KLANG, as it had been reported 

that KUALA SELANGOR Had been captured, and our forces were withdrawing towards 

KLANG. The forces available for the defence of KLANG were: 4/9 Jats, 1 Squadron 

3 Cavalry, the remnants of the Volunteer Bn and 73 Fd Battery rA. Two OPs were 

put out, one on each of the two roads leading North from KLANG. E Troop were in 
the Eastern road and D Troop on the Western or Coast road which leads to KUALA 

SELANGOR.

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The enemy made his advance down both of these roads, and, about 1000 hrs, contact 

was made with his forward troops. Capt Archer, in E Troop OP, had done some very 
careful registration of the road. Imagine his joy when 40 enemy cyclists rounded 

the bend, and the first round of gunfire crashed into them. Those who could, 

jumped off their bicycles and took cover in a ditch. The guns carried the joke a 

stage further, and the next crump landed in the ditch, and slew most of the 

remainder, any survivors being dealt with by the bayonets of the Jats.

D Troop were not so lucky in their Infantry Company. This Company had a short 

engagement with the enemy at about 1030. The enemy did not push in any attack, 

but started to outflank them. After the engagement was over, it was found that 

the majority of the company had disappeared into the jungle. Only twenty out of 

the original seventy remained.

About 1400 hrs, the remains of the Company and D Troop OP party found themselves 

surrounded. The Infantry immediately got ready to surrender. The Japanese 

appeared to be in no hurry, and remained in a circle licking their chops like a 

lot of hungry wolves. The OP Party sent down the OP Map Reference as a Target 

as Capt MacEwen had decided to shell themselves out. The Target was promptly 

queued by the GPO, but he was told to get on with it, and down came the shells. 

In the confusion, the OP party and some of the infantry managed to get away.

The loss of this Section of road caused the whole line to fall back into the 

Northern outskirts of KLANG. Orders from Corps HQ at KUALA LUMPUR were awaited, 

containing instructions as to when the bridge was to be blown up. As all telephone 

wires were down, 2Lt Traherne had gone to fetch the orders from Lt Col D'Aubuz, 

acting CRA at HQ KUALA LUMPUR. He remained that night awaiting orders, finally 

receiving them in the morning. He was told that it would be no good returning to 

KLANG, because the bridge along that road had been blown up. As he knew the 

route, which the Battery would be taking was the Coast Road, he himself took the 

North/South road and, meeting them, led them to a hide at SEPANG. In view of 

no orders from KUALA LUMPUR, the forces began a withdrawal via the Coast road, being 

met by guides. All the MT were back by 1830, and D Troop established an OP at the 

Police Station overlooking the bridge. Here, Capt MacEwen received a present from 

the Superintendent of Police in the way of a Ford V-8 saloon car.

At 1930 hrs, the bridge was blown or rather an attempt was made, for there was a 

very heavy minor explosion. The Sappers muttered something about damp charges, and 

then made off. The damage was inspected, and proved to be a small hole at the far 

end of the bridge, which a child of two could have filled up in a quarter of an 

hour with its bucket and spade! MajorDon decided to shell the bridge and try and 

explode the remaining charges sympathetically. About 20 rounds were fired, some 

of which were direct hits, but it was very difficult as it was pitch dark, and

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observation was well nigh impossible. He and Capt MacEwen then packed up, and 

rejoined the Battery about 3 miles down the main road. The Battery then moved 

to a hide in the SEPANG area. After two marches by night the Battery rejoined the 

Regiment in the SEGAMAT area.

SEGAMAT, the chief town of the District of that name, consisted of a couple of 

streets with shops, a Railway Station, some large imposing Schools, a Hospital, 

and a large stone bridge over the river MUAR. When RHQ arrived, 3 Indian Corps HQ 

was in a very large building, formerly the Government English School, with 9 
Indian Div HQ in a number of red brick villas on the other side of the road. 

RHQ went through, and found that the Padre and the Doctor had met the Manager of 

the Dunlop Rubber Estate at GENUANG, some 3 miles further on. He very kindly 

put SCOTT's bungalow at our disposal, and quarters for the men were found in 

the Estate Club quite close.

Shortly afterwards, Corps HQ moved on. The road past Div HQ usually looked like 

a village street on Market Day, with a number of cars parked outside. Sure 

enough, "George and Margaret", accompanied by a few friends, paid a visit, and 

the villa next the dwelling of the CRA received a direct hit. Div HQ then 

scattered itself further up the road. As the Batteries were due to arrive shortly, 

Major Fennell and Capt Howard, the Staff Captain RA, were ordered about 1700 hrs 

one afternoon to find an area for the Wagon lines.

All the best spots had already been occupied by old inhabitants, as the 

Australians had been in the area for some time. Promising tracks merely led to 

Australian MT Companies and Workshop Companies. Occupying a huge area was an 

Ammunition and Supply Dump. In desperation, they tried an Estate further down 

called VOWLES ESTATE at TENANG. They crossed the railway, and came to the 

junction of 3 roads. The right hand road led to some huge coolie-lines, still 

occupied, and came to a dead stop. The centre road started off very promisingly, 

but after half a mile, unit signs sprang up like mushrooms, so that was abandoned.

It was getting dark, and raining. The third road was tried. It started with 

some Sappers and Miners, and Signals, but then came an open space, then a large 

signpost with "To D Division" written on it. On went the explorers, "D" Division 

proved to be a labyrinth of roads, but by pure luck, they kept to the main track 

and reached the Bungalow and Office area. Would they be occupied? Heaven was on 

their side. The only occupant was a large black cat! "Thank God" cried Capt 

Howard reaching for a bottle of whisky, which he invariably carried in the back 

seat of his car, in case he felt faint! They drank in silence, and, by some 

freak      of chance managed to reach the main road again, noting various 

landmarks in the glare of the headlights, they having decided to trade on the 

night-blindness of the Japanese airmen.

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The rest of the Regiment arrived and went into action as previously described, 

with RHQ in some school buildings in SEGAMAT. There was an Australian Brigade, 

supported by the 2/15th Royal Australian Field Regt (25 pdrs), holding GEMAS, 

and the country between the 22nd and 8th Indian Infantry Bdes. It was the first 

time that the Regiment had met Australian troops, and they found the Australian 

Artillery very efficient and most cooperative. This acquaintanceship was renewed 

in SINGAPORE. The Regiment now formed a part of WESTFORCE under the Australian 

General Gordon-Bennett.

11 Indian Division now began to put in an appearance. For 3 nights in succession 

streams of lorries, trucks, went through. Many lorries packed with sleeping 

infantry, British and Indian. Others with stores and rations, here a Battery of 

25 pdrs, there Anti tank guns, more lorries, and then some 4.5 Hows. The constant 

roar of traffic reminded one of an arterial road leading to London. At last, the 

column came to an end, and the next question was: "How long would the Japanese take 

to arrive?"

First of all, there was much air activity, but this time our own Anti Aircraft gun 

were there to meet them. They were mostly from the Hong Kong-Singapore Brigade, 

and also Heavy AA from India. A train of petrol wagons was bombed near BUKIT 

SIPUT station but only two were hit. A Hospital train was bombed in GEMAS station - 
not a very sensible place to have it, as a matter of fact! Our own aircraft took 

a hand, and caught a large column of vehicles in a long cutting North of TAMPIN. 

They succeeded in destroying each end of the cutting, and bombed the column at 

leisure, causing many casualties.

Some Japanese armoured cars came up the main road in the Australian Sector. They 

let them go through, and then blew up the road behind them, and also in front, 

and then dealt with them with bombs and Molotov cocktails. There was heavy 

fighting round the GEMAS area - particularly near the Road and Railway bridges, on 

which harassing fire was put down by the Australians and 88 Fd Regt RA at night 

with 25 pdrs. As our 4.5 Hows could not reach the target, Hogshaw's section 

volunteered to act as ammunition numbers for the Australian troop in action close 

by. The offer was gratefully accepted.

Major-General Barstow, the Divisional Commander, arrived one day and went to see 

63/81 Fd Bty, who had served under him in the Ahmedzai Salient Operations in Waziristan 

in 1940. Major Fennell, who commanded 63/81 Fd Bty at that time, met him at the 

Bn HQ of the Gharwalis, and he asked where the positions were so that he could visit 

them. Major Bland suddenly turned up from Hospital, wearing the uniform of a 
Tyrolean sharpshooter, to whit a slouch hat, bush shirt, hose tops of a brilliant 

green, and a large civilian car! He had apparently been put in charge of a mobile 

column in the PORT DICKSON area - hence the large car!

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