Fall of Singapore - papers of Charles Laurie Price, part 5
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JEMALUANG. Force here was to fight retiring action if need arose, main object
was to patrol East Coast to Pontian River 1 miles north of Endau.
FURTHER ARRIVALS. About 800 on 'Zealandia' on Dec 6 mainly composed of Ordnance
and Mobile Laundry with their valuable electrical equipment. Escorted by HMAS
Sydney which was lost 24 hours after leaving the vessel. Further troops arrived
late in Jan.42. approx. 3000, who went straight into action. 13 AGH arrived on
Hospital ship 'Wanganella' in August.
MOVEMENTS. 2/3 MAC went to Ipoh evacuating from the Thailand border. 2/3 Res.
MT too the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders inside the Thai border. They did an
excellent job of transport.
FIGURES AT 8.12.41. | AIF Troops landed. | 16089. | ||
(a) K |
49 |
|||
(b) Repatriated. |
981 |
|||
(c) Tulip Force (Burma) |
47 |
1077. | Net Total. | 15,012. |
English Units. Sherwood Foresters, Loyals (Lanchashire) East Surreys, Norfolks,
Leicesters, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshires. Manchesters, Cambridgeshires, Gordon
Highlanders, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Indian Units. Dogras, Djins, Sikhs, Gamails, Jatts, Gurkhas, Hydrabads.
Malaya Units. Johore Volunteers. Malay Rgt. SSV Forces. Local Def.Corps.
Far East Units. Hong Kong and Shangai R.A. Survivors of 'Prince of Wales' and
Repulse'.
APPROX. TOTAL FIGURES. |
Total |
Losses. |
POW. |
AIF. |
17,781. |
2790. |
14,991. |
English. |
|
|
36,112. |
Indian. |
62,219. |
7210. |
18,887. |
80,000. |
10,000. |
70,000. |
AIF STRENGTH AND CASUALTIES.
Original. 18.2.41. |
5891 |
|
|
|
. | To 31.12.41. |
10198 |
|
|
to 16.2.42. |
3360 |
Total Landed. |
19,449. |
|
Deduct. | Repatriated Home. |
981 |
|
|
Died prior to action. |
49 |
|
|
|
Withdrawn.2/3 MT. 1 MO |
377 |
|
|
|
132 Sisters Evacuated 13.2.42. |
133 |
|
|
|
Tulip Force. |
47 |
|
|
|
GOC's Party evac.13.2.42. |
78 |
|
|
|
Killed in action. |
378. |
|
|
|
Died of wounds. |
106. |
|
|
|
Missing. |
2309. |
|
|
|
P.O.W's. |
14981. |
Total. |
19,449. |
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.
Convoy seen of Ambonia, part of the coast of Thailand. 'Raffles' sent out to all
stations to be prepared.
IJA Bombed Singapore and Pearl Harbour. The detectors of RAF station picked up
approach of enemy squadrons and tried their utmost to get in touch with ARP in
Singapore but without success, everyone had gone home, next they tried the Elect
Supply but man on duty could not be found to switch off all the lights over Singa-
pore, finally in sheer desparation they got in touch with the Govenor and it was
he who finally blew the first air raid siren heard over Singapore in the Campaign.
But it was too late to be of any use enemy planes had already approached close
enough to get the guide they wanted. Argylls move inside the Thai border about
23 miles. Our planes up-do not do damage expected xx-planes outnumbers and obsolete
Kota Bahru and Sungei Patani heavily bombed by the enemy. Jitra 72 miles north
of Penang manned by our troops. IJA arrive at Sungei Kra and Tanjong Patani.
9.12.41. Bridges blown and hold up IJA advance somewhat but not enough. Sengei
Patani, Butterworth, Alor Star heavily bombed while Kota Bahru aerodrome lost.
Road to Thai border and Grik (12m. this side) said to be no goos for enemy tanks
because bridges so bad yet they brought 8 ton tanks down to Betong 3 miles inside
the border as if nothing had happened.
10.12.41. Punjabis and 12 Indian Ede in action and Argyll and Sutherland Highlander
p . . later withdraw to Cahnglun (6m. border) Gurkhas attacked by tanks. Mistakes
made - bridges blown that should not have had powder wasted on them - others left
that should have been blown. Lose S.Patani and Alor Star 'Dromes. No Army Air
Force co-operation, planes and personnel got away with no support for army.
Leicesters in action but pushed into sea by tank drive. few survived. Brig. made
error and pulled into position 2 miles from cirrect spot. No excuse wither for that
position was noted as far back as Jul4l in manouvres but apparently danger was
not fully appreciated.
16.12.41. Battle of Jitra. Half of one Division destroyed and General i/c dismissed.
Lost Prince of Wales and Repulse off east coast by massed attacks of bombers.
Mastery of seas gone prevented us stopping infiltration, down west coast later on.
On east coast enemy naval vessels and transports operated almost unhindered.
12.12.41. Alor Star gone meant back to Gurun. 6th.Bde badly hit. IJA got in rear
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probably by train overnight because tanks were in evidence. Withdrawel to
Sungei Muda, ought to have been made right to Kuala Lumphur for complete re-
organisation as it was they made the mistake again and were slowly but
surely destroyed by fighting rearguard action.
13.12.41. Battle for Gurin. - Bombers continously of Penang -100 planes a day.
13/1. 12th.Bde. sent north -only one reserve Btn left now. All northern
aerodromes lost by this time.
16/20. Permission to evacuate Penang (Island) given - some destruction carried
out but 24 power boats left and these were used by the IJA to infiltrate up
rivers, creeks and West Coast all the time harassing our rear of troops down
the Peninsular. It was of little use holding up the IJA on the North-South
road when they were for ever turning the flank, another reason why the clean
break to K.Lumphur should have been made.
Evacuation of white people by British Austhorities at Penang leaving behind the
colored caused bitter comment throughout Malaya.
18.12.41. Back tp Parit Buntar (2 m.s.of Penang) to form line from Taiping to IPOH
and hold the IJA at Pe ak River.
20.12.41. General Heath ordered defences of Penang destroyed. General retirement
to Kuala Kangsar. IJA filtering along the West Coast and making threat to Perak
River. It was quickly realised enemy meant this for next main attack.
24.12.41.12 Bde ordered to Teluk Anson (mouth of Perak River) Air Force has no
fighters left.- fought to last flying man and only ground staff getting away.
Later-planes that did their best against terrific odds coming across from
Sumutra and Java. IJA superior and recogbised Red Cross wherever possible, the
Air Force that is, thought the Artillery and AA made their task doubly difficult
by setting up too near RAP's and Base Hospitals. Navy had only 8 or 9 vessels,
excluding Endau force of various sorts and sizes.
25.12.41. New line at Kampar (134m s. of Penang) Presence of IJA Troops
cause threat to our line which was forces to retreat to Slim River.
18.12.41. Review of East Coast Forces. Soon after hostilities started, civil
population in and around Mersing was evacuated to Kota Tinggi and Batu Pahat
areas stopping at last much of the fifth column of the past.
18.12.41. 27 Bde. moved up to support 22 Bde AIF 2/30 Bn taking position at
Jemaluang crossroads. 2/26 En were at Maiwai while the 2/29 stayed ay Tung-
Kluang. These were position to 1.1.42.
The 3rd.Indian Corps were guarding 17 miles of beach at Kuantan and 30 miles
at Kota Bahru. Forces up north 6th.8th and 16th. Bdes.of above Corps had done
a great deal of fighting and their original lines were turned by enemy. 22nd.
Indian Bde at Kuantan was now attacked by enemy, who had to use lifebelts to
cross Sungei at Kuantan. AIP felt enemy would do this again at Mersing so provi
anti personnel mines at Mersing River, and anti tank ditches were dug at Palm
Beach as tanks had been landed Kuantan. On the fall of Kuantan enemy planes
visited Endau bombing and machine gunning Malay Navy was there and put up
a great show - were recommended for the coolness under fire. At this time two
planes of the Malay Volunteer Force were sent up but were soon destroyed -
planes being old moths with the machine gun as only prtection and no cover what-so-ever
in the cockpit or at the sides. The enemy Army '97' were impervious to
ordinary bullets being armour plated. Food riots broke out at Endau.
End of Dec 41. Back to west coast. Battle for Gurin had broken 6th. Indian Bde.
and 15th.Ind.Bde were in poor shape, nor were the 12th.22nd and 28th any better
off. Sctually less than half 6th. 8th. and 22nd and 28th. were of the slightest
use. Toward end of Dec. news comes of fifty Hurricanes on their way. 18th.Eng.
Div originally bound for Caucasus were diverted to Malaya and due to arribe early
January. Enemy at this stage at mouth of Sungei Kluang. (30m. from KL) and
turning our slim River (70m. from KL) position.
Early January 1942. Still north of Slim River between Trolak and Bidor. Enemy n
brought into action another Division -their 3rd - the most formidable Imperial
Guards.
7.1.42. 28th. Indian Bde. in action and suffer heavy losses. Gen.Heath suggest
retreat to Muar-Segemat-Endau line in view of losses of aerodromes.
12.1.42. General Wavell at GHQ and on seeing Slim River position agreed with Ge
Heath re retreat.
7.1.42. Plans formed for the formation of an disposal of West Force to take all
possible troops except those required for Mersing Area which was 22 Bde AIF
and which they intended to strengthen by adding Jetts and Dogras from Indian
Army. 11th. Indian Div. went to Ponghan (60m n.of S'pore) to re-organise -9th.
Ind.Div. 45th.Ind.Bde and 27 AIF Bde to Muar Area with 65th.Bty of 2/15Fd.Rgt.
to support 45thInd.Bde. The 9th. Ind.Div had done little dighting and was placed
with HQ at Segemat, 8th.Bde at Batu Anam, 22 Ind.Bde at Batu Kassim.
9.1.42. 27 AIF Bde moved - HQ Segemat, 2/26 at Jemaluang, 2/29 B.Kassim 2/30 B
Gemas.
10.1.42. As much as possible during retirement 'scorched earth' policy had been
carried out and in view of comments, mostly adverse, against the Indian Reg.45th
Bde in particular, it should be noted the Bde was not up to standard consisting
mainly of lads 16-17 years of age with 3-4 months training when 5 years in peace
time is the least in which one can turn out 1st class sepoy. They had only been
in the country 1 week and had little i'dea of loyalty and were mentally 8 yrs. ol
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Best Indian Troops went to Middle East. In the first place they should never
have been placed on the north bank of the Muar River, rear bank was natural
and obvious position so using the river as a tank trap, error was in attempt
to hold town instead of position. Kuala Lumphur Falls. Then 1lth.Ind.Div.
6th. and 15th. Bdes of the 3rd.Ind.Corps came streaming back from north causing
congestion on the narrow roads, creating confusion with their panic,choas
of traffic indescribable. Division had been retreating from the 8th.Dec
to 10 Jan without a let up. The 53rd.Bde of 18 Div also 9th.Div both due to
arrive. (Trouble was once retreat was obvious motto should been retreat in a
big way- not nibble at it -. You can rest troops if you make clean get away.
Fortunately and only thing to save us further damage was enemy did not follow
up as quickly as expected)
9.1.42. Kluang drome attacked by 18 enemy planes - 2 Blenheim bombers and a
Wirraway destroyed. Dutch arriving soon after raid.
12.1.42. Heavy bombing in Muar area by enemy. 2/26 ordered from Jemaluang to
Batu Amus. 53rd.Bde (18 Eng Div) arrive singapore heavily bombed while disembarking
during rain storm- journey 11 weeks via Cape. Rested from 13 -15th.
ordered into action on 18th. Still in winter clothing,refitted while resting
at Tanglin.
13.1.42.9th. Eng.Div landed and went to Segemat where enemy immediately bombed
them due probably to site selected as HQ -like most HQ in this respect- the
biggest and most palatial houses in area.
10.1.42. East coast. Very heavy rains fell inMersing for 6 days, flooded
main roads and cut off supplies via Kota Tinggi, these and evacuation of cas.
had to be via Kluang. Worst however was that the 7000 mines laid were rendered
useless. Actually we lost more men in setting and preparing of the field
than the enemy in traversing it.
13.1.48. All troops evacuated Malacca leaving open town to save damagining it.
11/16 Gemas Ambush Story. By 2/30 Bn. 27 AIF Bde had been in support of 22
Bde were now ordered to move to Segamat and arrived on 1lth. Original sites
idea to hold road and range north of Seremban but loss of K.L. and rapid
enemy advance it was no longer possible and it was decided to hold a site 5
miles north of Gemas 2/29 Bn in reserve, 2/30 ordered forward, Btn in position
and enemy expected about 16th giving 4 days to get ready as enemy 100 m.off.
13.1.42. Main part of the 27 AI Bde at Batu Anen, heavy rains at Gemas. Enemy
move with greater speed than anticipated, scheme was for 3 platoons to go
forward to junction of main road and creek form ambush. 16.1.42. Capt.Duffy
and 32 men lie 'doggo' 2/30 Bn retired to a point behind Gemas and perimter
camp. Action result 1 Off 17 OR's killed Wounded 3 Off. 27 OR's Missing 8 OR's
Enemy loss estimated 700. 2/29 Bn move to form Div Reserve and replaced by
2/19 Bn from East Coast. The 2/19 and 2/29 fight together. Critism of 27 Bde
for insufficiont use of radio communication for this reason not called somplete
success.
11.1.42. Mersing raised to the ground by explosion. 2/19 sight first Japanese
a party of 0 north of Endau.
1 .1.42. Enemy planes continuously attacking Endau with little or no opposition
and land forces constantly reinforced with fresh troops. It was decided to
let them in at 2300 hrs on 19th. Successful rear attack made on enemy at Anak
Endau. 16.1.42. Wore enemy contacted by patrol on bycicles along the beach-8
miles n. of Endau. HMS Kalana sunk and HMS Shanan beached.
17.1.42. Our forces left Endau. 18.1.42. Enemy ambushed north of Endau by patrol
of 2/20 Bn. Enemy on bycicles retired to undergrowth on sides of road but
not effective. West Coast 3 rd.Bde on important triangle one Btn. Yong
Peng 1 Btn. Batu Pahat and 1 Btn Ayer Hitam HQ at Batu Pahat.
18.1.42. At Kluang 6 th. Bty.bombed, Jatte in Muar and Parit Jawa- broke into
confusion and withdrawing in choas leaving transport arms etc. 2/29 Ba ordered
to Muar - IJA enter town - 2/29 attacked 4 armoured cars and 1 troop of
anti-tank going to Muar - meet Norfolks at Bukit Panjang know nothing at all
of the enemy. light enemy tanks come dow the road but anti tank gun does good
job on all five. Indians rush past 65th Bty in panic. 071 hrs. 3 more light
tanks move down but destroyed by anti-tank 400 yds in front of 2/29 position.
Heavy attack on both sides of the road. Bayonet attacks on D Coy of 2/29 but enemy
beaten off by Bren Guns carriers which were much pierced by IJA armour piercing
bullets. Later. Enemy too accurate on 6 th. Bty guns and forced to withdraw.
Enemy dead well dressed and equipped being members of the Guards. 1150 hrs.
CO of 2/29 Bn Col.Anderson riding pillion on cycle trying to contact Bde.HQ,
at Bakri Crossroads, found the road blocked, turned wuickly, both he and driver
wounded by Machine Gun bullets. Col. Robertson fell from bike before reaching
position was quickly picked up but died within half and hour. A Coy 2/29
tried to rejoin Bn. but could not on account of enemy fire xx at road block.
1900 hrs. Broke through and remained here to eneble Jatts to be withdrawn around
then next day. 2030 hrs. Strong enemy force reported by patrols to be coming
left forward coys warned, few minutes later 150 attacked with sword and bayonet
but were thrown backand several mortar bombs dropped amonbat them, they
reformed and attacked another platoon of the saem Coy and very fe got out
unhurt, inspection showed dead and wounded were of Imperial Guards. Rest of
night quiet. 2/29 given order to retake Muar this was supposed to be done at
night Bn report simply could not do it. 9th.Eng.Div cover retreat of 2/25 and 2/
from Segamet. Segamat set on fire by mistake by AIF -9th.Div.hard time getting
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through [[wgile?]] covering retreat. 2/26 and 2/30 Bns go behind Segamat R. at
night.
19.1.42. Parit Sulong bridge infiltrated by enemy, attacks against 3/16
Punjabis, Norfolks and Loyals. Platoons sent to guard bridge and given
wrong information by RAMC Officer. Bridge position given away and never
regained - this cut off retreat of Muar Forces on 21 and 22 Jan. Alteration
of plan so that 9 Eng.Div would hold line of Main Road. 27 Bde A.I.F. to
Labis and on to Yong Peng owing to serious position of Forces against coast
Muar Township destroyed by gun-fire. Enemy dive-bombers right on to 45 Ind
Bde, All Bde staff except Brig. Duncan killed-Capt Julien 6 5 Btn. wounded.
Again Bde building was in too promineut position. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Battle
of Bakri started- 2/29,2/19 Bns.AIF and 4 5 Indian Bde form perimeter, Col.
Anderson of 2/19 Bn AIF in charge. He lator recieved the V.C. for his efforts
At 1 30 hrs large enemy partyenter lines and commence shelling with heavy
artillery, their A.O.Ps must have been well placed because although the
Indians ran from side to side of the road shells also switched and heavy
casualties were suffered. at 1630 Hrs. big guns lifted and mortars start and
enemy advance under shelter of it as usual with the front line heavy with
automatics. Things look black on the left side but counter attack ordered and
enemy do not wait to argue with cold steel. Brig. Duncan killed leading
counter attack At 1730 Hrs. Maj. Oliffe now C.O. 2 29 Bn. hears by wireless
2/19 has been trying to get forward to 2/29 but unable. 2/29 ordered to cut
way back. A Coy 2/29 suffered severely crossing open patch and H.Q. took
wrong turning in swamp and head back across country. B and C Coys arrive
safely and C Coy only had 3 officers and 45 men left.
20/1/42 This day and all next all rearguard by 2/29 to 2/19. 2/29 never out
of contact with enemy all that time. 2/26 Bn.in f ront of right of main road
2/30 in reserve. 160 trucks loaded with wounded move out, enemy aircraft
overhead, enemy infantry on both sides of the road, road block ahead, convoy
raked by fire. M.G.from planes then mortar fire along the road whilst the
road block held up convoy. Indians run away. AlF mako 7 bayonet charges to
get convoy away. Col.Anderson well to the for. Sgt. Barton of 65 Bn.fires at
100 yds into road block. Truck found with Capt. Julien in it had apparantly
turned off at the block,he was dead. Enemy block houses firing down the road
was cleared by infantry and convoy moved on at night, all very exhausted and
many wounded,expecting enemy any minute.
21/1/42. 53 Eng.Bde placed under orders of Lt.Gen.Bennett. Attack by British
units due to stac at 1600 hrs. 21st. but did not eventuate until dawn on 22nd
Enemy had come up from Batu Pahat and sandbagged Parit Sulong brige which they
held in force. Convoy halted. Enemy planes in action but save the road by
using M.Gs and not bombs. Perimeter formed 300 yds from road i nrubber
Serious cases loaded on to 4 ambulances all patients men of no military use
whatever, sent to bridge and asked IJA C.O. to let them through. He refused
and said"vehichles to stay there on road" and asked for capitulation of force
Force in perimeter await reinforcements but they were unable to get through
being held up 6 miles further back. Enemy attack with mortars from rear. Tanks
heard coming down road,no firing to disclose position. Wounded in trucks had
no chance. The 5 heavy tanks arrive at crossroads 500 yds away and fired all
guns. Sgt Tait 2/15 Fd Regt AIF then manned the 25 pounders on his own and
although he had to run from the gun to ammunition 15 paces away through a hail
of lead he continued until tanks were driven off. Later with Lt.Ross he again
broke up a haevy tank attack which this time had entered the perimeter itself
Sgt. Tait recomeended for D.C.M. At 2245 hrs convoy tries to move off via
river side, later men of 65 Bn eventually reach Yong Peng. Of 140 men of 2/15
Fd. Regt.there were 30 reach base and 20 arrive at Hospital.
22/1/42.Five tanks attack 2/29 En and 2/19 Bn in early morning. Col.Anderson
orders "break contact with enemy". and they spent the night in jungle behind
Bukit Inas later reach Yong Peng next night then to Base to reform. 2/29 Bn
lost at Muar 16 Officers and 270 O/Rs killed and missing and of those who g
out 2 Offs and 74 O/rs were wounded. Col. Anderson receives V.C. Under Lt.Gen
Bennett British forces attack, British artillery could not do job asked of
them being new to country and conditions. 6 Ind. Div. ordered by Malya Command
to retire in daylight, when retreat is always carried out at night and only23XXXXX attack by dau.
23/1/42. Loyals releive Norfolks and Punjabis. Enemy attack with tanks many
were crashed but roads were blocked and loyals cut off. They had to cross
swaps after being badly mauled by tanks on the road,those getting out joined
2/26 & 2/30 Bns AIF and idid good work stopping enemy at Yong Peng. Threat
next at Ayer Hitamwhere 27 Bde AIF Headquarters were. 2/26 move fron Yong Peng
to Ayer Hitam crossroads. 22 Ind. Bde to Paloh, 8 Ind.Ede north of Paloh.
Enemy turning movements seen on flanks again. From Ayer Hitam to coast
were 8 Ind. Bde 22 Ind Bde 27 Bde AIF Loyals and 53 Brit. Bde.
24/1/42.Last Aust Convoy arrives S'pore with 3360 troops,Ord and Med Units.
left Sydney 10 Jan on acquitania via Bass Straits-escort Canberra. Arrive
Sundra Straits NEI and transhipped to 6 small dutch vessels escorted by
allied wraships, disembarked Keppel Harbour and went to Tampoi. Fighting
at Sungei Sembrong by 2/26 2/30 and Loyals. First real talk of retreat to
Island. lack of water reason given for wiping of idea
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of holding a- line around JB. Gen. Percival decided that owing to movement being
denied his troops on the mainland he would have to retire to the island. West
Coast forces then were 70 miles from S'pore and East Coast Forces 83 miles.
Latter to retire first being the smaller.
DETAILS OF EAST COAST FORCES FROM JAN.19 to JAN 31.- when 22 Bde crossed Cause-
way on to the island. 19.1.42. Enemy attack bridge over Mersing River but our,
artillery MG's and Mortars wipe out 1 Coy of attacking force. Right through,
Campaign AIF Artillery did a magnificent job but were hampered by superior
Commands. 19/26 Art. clean up enemy gun and MG positions as soon as they made
them. OP's were well placed and enemy worked from side of road thereafter. As
previously stated area gad been well mapped out and one of enemy guns obligingly
set up on a corner. peg - needless to state what happened to it. 20.1.42. Heavy
bombing Kuantan evacuated. 22.1.42. Heavy bombing of Mersing,Jemuluang razed
to ground - demolishing work of 2/10 Fd.Coy at various places always well done.
their responsibilities the Sedii Boom, Mersing Endau boats and bridges 21 m.
from Endau right back via Mersing to Kota Tinggi. Gen. Heath gives Brig.Taylor
22 Bde, message 'It looks like S'pore Island- Jemaluang and Mersing not vital.
Don't use troops to stop holes."
23.1.42. 22 Bde HQ sees Col. Forsythe BGS 3 Ind.Corps. Brig.Taylor asked by
Gen.Heath if anything he needed and jokingly he asked for AA Guns- much to his
surprise 4 Beauforts were sent. Eng.Officer in charge serwed during the blitz
in England and was unconventional in his ideas as he was outspoken in his.
critism of the lack of defences of Singapore to what he and the rest of the
world were led to believe. He never camoflaged his guns in fact he hung washing
on them to attrack the enemy planes. After enemy had tasted some of his doses
in the initial attack and they lost one plane they were very wary and left them
alone therafter- although guns moved and got 4 planes with the first 300 rounds
fired. Secret of their success as compared to mistake of practically every
other gun in Malaya was that they opened up and held their fire while the enemy
was diving at them, others opened up after they had gone past and tried to hit
the tail of the departing plane which was too much to expect. 2/18 Bn came out
of the line to prepare 'Nithdale Estate' Ambush.
25.1.42. KT experienced 1st Air Raid when bombers dropped their load in an
effort to get the RAAF listening post. 25/26 2/20 Bn moved to Jemaluang crossroads
and East Force became mobile.
27.1.42. NITHDALE ESTATE AMBUSH.- only fight of any size by 22 Bde on mainland.
0300 hrs. Enemy marched into trap north of estate. Enemy casualties approx.
600- D Coy 2/18 Bn lost 86 killed inc. 5 Officers and 70-80 wounded.Major
Edgeley killed in action. Ambushed enemy action finished O8OOhrs. 2400 rounds
fired by 2/10 Fd Rgt. After this pasting by Art. enemy never worried East
Coast Forces again on the lainland. O100 hrs. A Coy 2/18 had meanwhile ambushed
some IJA Troops at 'Julie Estate. Also enemy had sent 1 cruiser 4 Destroyers
2 Transports carrying 2600 men to destroy Endau forces and land at Endau. While
landing25/30 of our planes went to meet them and deal with them. Being old
Vilderbeests' only half armed - 2 returned to Base. 22 Bde IAF had been
supported by Dogras 2/18 Gordons RA and AA. 30.1.42.22 Bde AlF back to Kota
Tinggi. 31.1.42. 22 Bde AIF due to cross Causeway before daylight but held up
3/4 hours due to delay in movement of 3 Ind.Corps and West Coast Forces -
crossed at 0800 hrs. Hurricanes flying overhead on guard. 22 Bde used 300
wireless sets and did good work as against early critism lewelled at 27 Bde.
West Coast Forces. 25.1.42. 15Ind.Bde at Rengam were ordered to Batu Pahat but
xxxx were cut off- Navy evacuated them. Batu Pahat captured by enemy. 53 Eng.
Bde and Gurkhas at Pontain Kechial sent to form line to coast. Bn.at Sengarang
got cut off - road block ended hope of all relief.- bad mess up by armoured cars.
Loyals back to Fortress and Gordons brought up in their place. Threat to Simpam R
Rengam so Gordons move up to 49 m post where 27 Bde.AIF made "Porcupine Defence'
2/26 at 44 m.post 2/30 at 42 m.post Bns astride road.
1000 hrs.Gordons withdrew from 49 m. to 42 m.post. without orders which left
2/26 Bn in front position. 26.1.42. Gordons made contact with enemy. 2/26 cover
9 Ind.Div retirement to 42 m.post. Heavy attacks by enemy on roads.
27.1.42. Gordons put under 27 Bde Cmd. at 42 m.post 2/20 there too- bombed
8 Ind.Bde at Rengam coming down the roas to pass through 22 Ind.Bde. at Layang.
27 AIF Bde had to fight to get 9 Ind.Div out. 27 Bde at 30 m.post made good
retirement - bayonet attack before clean get away. 5/11Sikhs gace good account
of themselves in counter attack when enemy xxxx caught them at tea.
28.1.42. 22 Ind.Bde cut off - captured or destroyed- Mjr.Gen Barstow missing.
We now had 5 Divs.of IJA against us and no prepared defences in Johore to retire
to. 0200hrs. Gordons report contact on their left. 0930hrsEnemy attack 1000hrs
driven off 1400hrs Enemy attack 2/26 Bn moving right all the time.1530 hrs
Enemy attack moves from 2/26 Bn to 2/30 Bn. 1600 hrs- driven off. 1800 hrs.
2/30 Bn attacks enemy-heavy fire- gas used by enemy? 1900 hrs 2/30 Bn retires
jungle area dangerous - withdrawel commenced. 29/30 3 days spent withdrawing
from mainland to island. Roads covered and plans made. Roads set with booby
traps. Traffic confusion evident disabled vehicles should have been pushed off
the road as they held traffic up. 2/15 Fd.Rgt. left complete set of withdrawel
orders in truck - patrol from 2/26 Bn set truck on fire. 2300hrs 2/30 ordered to
withdraw from 21 m.post. 301.42. 2/30 dawn patrol shoot up enemy patrol, capture
one Officer secure maps and papers. Dive bombers at Kulai behind 277 AlF Bde.
-8-
Orders for final withdrawel via Tebrau Leap received. 31.1.42.2/30 embuss
support troops them move off. 2/26 embussed at midnight.
0600 hrs All the Bns.in the perimeter defence of the island. The 11th.Ind.Div.
had been fighting continuously from Dec 8 until it reached the Causeway.
FIGHTING ON THS ISLAND.
31.1.42. Most British Forces on the island placed as follows. :-
9 Ind.Div & 11 Ind.Div of 3rd.Ind.Corps guarding North Sector from pipeline to
Sungei Seletor. The NE and East guarded by 18 Eng.Div which had been badly cut
about and comprised 53, 54, 55Bdes. Norfolks in53 badly mauled on mainland.
Southern area with centre at Singapore are from Sungei to Jurong- Pearce Resevoir
and Paya Lebar Road manned by 12 Ind.Bde (badly hit) 5/2 Punjabis and Dogras,
Manchesters (MG Bn) and Malay Rgt. Sw Section held by 44 Ind.Bde -3 Bns.Punjabis
and 1 Bn in reserve under Brig.Ballantyne - limits S.Jurong on left and Choa Chu
Kang Road on right had 26000 yards to guard.
NW Sector assigned to 22 Bde AIF their lines extending from Choa Chu Kang Road
to Sungei Kranji the 2/15 Fd.Rgt supporting the 22 Bde AIF also the 'Dal'Force.
From S.Krangu to pipe line 27 Bde AIF consisting of 2/26 and 2/30 Ens supported
by 2/10 Fd.Rgt. 2/30 mainly at area around the pipe line and 2/26 cast of S.Krangi.
The 2/29 at 4 p.m. at Yew Tree Village Col. Pond as CO - acted as reserve Bn for
AIF, mainly to 27 Bde. 13 A/Tank Btn in reserve 2/4 MG Bn had a Coy with each
of the 3 Bns of 22 Bde AIF and 1 in reserve. Attack expected from 8SW area near
S. Jurong - but from S.xx Jurong to S.Krangi line was not prepared. To have made
any preparations was said to be a 'Defeatist' plan attitude by Malaya Command.
Pillboxes were on NE side northing on N4 or West. Originally estimated at least
1 Div. needed for reserve almost every unit on the island had fought and lost men.
There were heaavy Is" guns to prevent naval landings but they could not fire across
the island. Should have been on 3600 turntables.
15" Battery at Beuna xxxxxx Vista 9.2" at Blakit Mati also 2 x e" Batterys, 3 x9.2"
on NE Island. 2 Anti Torpedo ship batteries at entrance of Keppel Harbour. Most
of fighting for the island depended on Jap. attack against 22 Bde AIF and later
retirement it had to make.
Soon after 31.1.42 air position was that planes left Tengah aerodrome and fles to
umutra. Worked from there at odd times. 22 Bde AlF had 16000 yards of line.
7 Bde had 5000 yards. Based on actual calculations of 15000 yards to a Bn.
22 Bde should have had 4500 yards and 27 Bde 3000 yards.
22 Bde had support of Dal Force a small unit of Chinese with White Officere,
armed with shot guns. This forca received special mention. Each Bn. had a perimeter
defence. Although narrowest part of the island lay in 22 Bde area no appreciation
was made, no plans made for defence or withdrawel of troops to that or any
other part of the island. nor were there and plans made for co-ordinating artillery
fire.
1-Sth. During this time digging, wiring and building of slit trenches could be
done was done. 6 tons of wire used as against 400 tons at Mersing and yet for a
far greater job. Singals between 22, 27 and 44 Bdes at this timr was very good.
Enemy aircraft veru busy, mainly reconnaisance. Last Eng.reinforcements arrive
on Empress of Asia. Bombed and sat on fire outside harbour. é-7th night - BEL's
were turned off for patrol to proceed across straits. 2/19 En under Lt.Ottley,
2/20 Bn under Lt.Homer, both killed in action later. These patrols stayed 24 hrs.
on mainland and returned next night when agsin BEL'a were turned off for them.
saw enemy concentrations around JB and made other reports. Request by Bde for
harassing fire on concentrations refused. NkxxXXXXXEK 8.2.42. Enemy opened up
with everything they had, shelld of all sizes, very heavy mortar and incessant,
MG Fire, concentrating on area of 22 Bde. From 0700 to 2000 hrs about 250.000
shells fell in that area, all BEL's were destroyed. CHd refuse to allow shelling
of Johore or even Observation Balloon. GHQ itself bombed by enemy -too many brass
hats, red arm bands and cars about for enemy not to know where it was. Enemy
attemoted several landings - feints at Palau Ubin towards Changi also near
S.Selatar in the North - object being to hold Bns there so they could not help
wherever main attack was being made.
2/30 hrs.Enemy make 7 landings on 22 Bde.Sector- 6 veing successful - shipped
18000 men acrosssin an bour by 150 power boats carrying 30/40 men each time
thr round trip taking 8 mins. Vessels had been kept up Sungeis on mainland were
capable of carrying light tanks or part of a field gun. Note 18 Bns of enemy
Attack against Dal Force succeeded and drive made for Tanga Drome. 2/20 near
Choa Chu Kang Road were surrounded - dribe was made between 2/18 and 2/19 Bne.
in girection of Ama Meng Village. 2/10 Fd.Coy fought as Inf. with 2/20 Bn.
2000 Hrs 6" guns on Tanjong Pasir Lebar where 44 Inf.Bde wwas, were damaged. All
communícations between Bdes and Bns gone. 2 landings made against each of 3 Bns.
A/Tank guns lost on beaches many machrne Guns also lost on beaches by 2/4 MG.Bn.
Col.Varley ordere 2/19 Bn.back - with artillery there were altogether 2300 AIF
against 19000 enemy. Midnight 8/Sth. 2/29 Bn ordered to Tanga Drome position.No.)
and No.2 Coys set up as Inf. forming spocial reserve Bn under Major Daggers also
Johore Volunteers Engs to Tanga.
9.2.42. Retirement to Bulim Village in early morning. 12 Inf.Bde 4/19 Hyderbads
and Argylls brought up. Delay in getting 2/29 En in position- nost of them on
29 Bn Hy did not notify signalson moving. Terrifie fighting north
patrol, Daw. 8
oconeng Dlliage. 2/18 En and Engs fought well and then retired. Col.Ashton
-9-
got 2/20 En out of 2 Offs 16 killed or wounded and 4 0 Casualties of 700 men.
2/19 twice successfully fight their way out when completely surrounded, third
time could not make their way through to Tanga Drome. 1 Coy. lost which became
attached to 2/29 Bn. Noon 2/29 contacted no enemy during the morning, but at.
mid-day as orders came for counter attack enemy came into grips with them, thei
forwarded company contacted 300 men, enemy casualties heavy. Attack held but
enemy had come round on right flank, and held Tenga Drome. Bn.orders to withdra
and go round Pulim Village for the night. Night 1 Ind.Ede (11Div.) sent up to
strengthen 44 Ind.Rde. Retreat to Kranji Jureng line. Punjabis forward. 2/3
Res.M.T. leave Malaya by steamer. Only 00 men of 2300 men of 22 Bde reached
Bulim Village. Enemy attempt landings in 27 Bde sector. S.Mandai against 2/26bn
and at S.Ketchil where 2/30 were- both attacks repulsed.
Lt.Smythe of 2/30 bn caught between patrol boat and enemy and killed. Oil dump
had béen set on fire by enemy and huge black clouds regular feature over land-
scape at night a crimson glow and a great beacon for which enemy bombers and
fighters could pick their objects out.
10.2.42. 27 Bde to destroy Woodlands and Yew Tree Oil Wells and Kranji Wireless
Station then to return to Pukit Mandai. 27 Bde then had to face west so that
the enemy could not get near or behind the pipeline. Enemy shell 2/26 and 2/30
areas. 1800 hrs 'X' Bn formed from Con.Depot and OED now arrive Reporst from
areas sent into Bde Div and Malaya Command by various units but Officers
information was erroneous and not always verified.
1600 hrs.Malaya Commmand order 'that lost area be retaken in three hops' Order
could not be carried out, not enough troops, not able to change and relieve
troops who were tired out and in many cases lacking food. When rfts. were sent
owing to the confusion were often unable to locate units. 2/29 Bn ordered to
contact Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders but in doing so A Coy with CO. Adj.
and BHQ were cut off. X Btn with 3 Vickers and 3 Armoured Cars and 3 carriers
covered retreat of 22 Bde to reformatory Road and cleared up the enemy coming
down from Tanga Drome. Later Afternoon Sheels scream overhead 10 AGH at Oldham
Hall, martar and machine Gun fire nearby. This was a declared area and marked as
such, enemy in hitting it did so intentionally as artillery was probably firing
in an arc. Planes repsected area.
27 Bde ordered to change from 3 Ind.Corps apparently not advised and this let
enemy through gap. Frangi oil dump set on fire but ammunition dump not cleared
so that enemy received much ammunition.
Later O.Pip work of 27 Bde from good. 22 Bde ceased to exist many later being
back in X bn or got smashed. 1900 hrs Pressure heavy. Argyll & Sutherland High,
ordered to withdraw. 2/29 Bn at Sungoi Pensiang heavily bombed. 2/29 come under comd 12 Ind.Dde on reaching Bukit Penjang and to rest for the night preparatory
to counter attack in morn'ng. 27 Bde under 11 Div. counter attacked towards Krang
but cancelled as 22 Bde in the meantime had been forced back. Owing to confusion
among Indians enemy broke through. 2/18 Bombed and shelled. 2 boys lost. Chaos
at 44 Ind.Bde. Generals Wavell, Percival and Bennett at GHQ in Holland Road
when enemy bombed it. Plans for counter offensive formed- idea good but no one
knew for certain where troops were. In the order of the day Gen Wavell called troo
'a lot of damned rats'.
Enemy tanks heard on Tengah Drome on previous night.
2200 hrs. 2/29 again the front line Bn when enemy attacks, move to break it up
with hand grenades likely to succeed when enemy tanks dash into centre of posit
and Bn had to withdraw down line of road to contact BHC. This was not done till
dawn when they had reached Holland Rd as enemy so far south.
11.2.42. Enemy tank attacks on 2.26 and 2/50 which were nearly surrounded.
Former at pipeline near Swiss Rd Cottage, latter at Pierce Resevoir. Enemy next
attack in direction of Mt. Faber driving towards the docks. 0400 hrs. More orders
to retire. Only 150/180 of 22 Bde left and it ceased to exist as Bde. 0300 hrs
X Stn. caught by enemy in front of ASC petrol dump which caught fire. Bn was
overrun by enemy, 50% wiped out. Col.Bayles of 2/26 Bn killed. 2/30 Bn cut off.
2/26 Bn moved to Botanical Gardens. Sort of front formed by 16 Eng. Div, Sherwood
Foresters and 2/29 Bn. Bn counter attack made but broken up by IJA tanks.
Estimated at this time there were 2000 Australians in Singapore who had been
separated from their units and had come out of the line for a well earned rest
and a good feed. 2359 hrs. 76 guns were put up behind the 10 AGH at Oldham Hall
and pur up a terrific barrage over the Hospital and did some harassing fire
to give troops a breather and to enable them to get some food and clothing. Guns
accidentally killed some of our troops whilst getting the runge.
12.2.42. East side troops brought across to to Golf Links. 18 Eng.Div did good work
at this stage. Orders to mann final perimeter arrive. 2/29 and Recco Bn pulled
out late on the 11th thinking they were left alone. 2/26 to Selatar Rifle Club &
1/30 Bn stay at Swiss Club. Enemy tanks nearly into Singapore stopped at Farrar
Road by 2/10 Fd.Rgt who were coming down B.Timah Rd. The enemy had by-passed
AlF and gone along Alexandra Rd and near the Gold Links. 10 AGH come under
Motar fire and orders given to retire to city proper. Between 2000 and 2359 AGH
staff moved approx. 1000 patients together with equipment into Cathay and other
City Buildings. Heavy shelling of city. About 1000, special men evacuated -500
got away. OOC's party of 78, 132 AANS and 1 MO. 27 Bde in perimeter. 2/26 at
Farrar Rd.
14.2.42. Enemy attack swinging round to NE alde side with feint from Palau, Ub
(10)
Mid'nt Enemy bombers go after ships leaving Singapore, Four ships sailing on 13th.
sunk. 1 ashore and most survivors die of black water fever. Steamer 'Nata Hari'
believed lost with Aust. Nurses on board. Terrific confusion. Little firing done by
2/10 Fd. Rg due to lack of control.
14.2.42. AASC come in as Ihf at Bukit Besar. Enemy at Tanglin. Indians retire to
and enter Rospital grounds at Alexandra and firing MG at enemy with the result that
the enemy enter and shoot and bayonet patients capable of walking and the staff. The
enemy could hardly be blamed for this as in the first place our troops made a breach
of the rules. When the enemy entered they found the Indians had climbed into beds
and pretended to be patients and it is a wonder that any patients were left alive.
15.2.42. Heaviest bombing and shelling the City of the Camapign. Enemy planes
continually over the City. Enemy dive bombed and shelled the City at will. Final
perimeter Tanglin Rd. Newtown Circus Paver Lebar Rd. Very heavy casualties ay Bukit
Timah Rd and Golf Links. 10 AGH in Cathay Bldg came under very heavy shell fire
and bombing from 1100 hrs onwards killing 27 troops and wounding many others who
were with 2 Con.Depot in a section of the saem building. Convoys of ambulances
continued to arrive at Hospital during shelling and one ambulance received a direct
hit a few seconds after it had unloaded its patients.
CEASE FIRE.came at 4 p.m. thought out in front and widely spread areas out of touch
it went on spasmodically till 2030 hrs when the all-clear siren was sounded in
Singapore. 1730 hrs. The first IJA troops to enter the City did so in cars, trucks
and foot in an orderly manner. The enemy used so far as we can gather 5 Divisions
on the Island with 4 in reserve on the mainland and lost about 1½ Div in taking
the Island.
S/sgt Price
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